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CRIMINAL LAW-PRESENTENCE REPORTS-ALLEGATIONS OF PRIOR CRIMINAL
ACTIVITY-FACTUAL DETERMINATIoN-DEGREE AND BURDEN OF PROOF-United
States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1971), cert, denied, 404 U.S. 1061
(1972).
Janice Weston, the defendant in a federal narcotics case, was convicted of re-
ceiving, concealing, and facilitating the transportation of heroin, knowing it to
have been imported contrary to law.' The trial judge indicated that he felt a mini-
mum statutory sentence of five years would be appropriate, to which counsel for the
government objected, asking for the production of a presentence report. The report
given to the court contained defendant's prior criminal record and further alleged
that she had: (1) operated as the chief supplier of heroin to the western Washing-
ton area; (2) made periodic trips to Mexico and Arizona to purchase heroin for
resale, perhaps as often as every two weeks; (3) made profits of approximately
$140,000 on investments of $60,000 in connection with each of the aforemen-
tioned trips; and (4) 'worked with four distributors who had already been appre-
hended, two of whom had been tried and sentenced, and all of whom were identi-
fied by name.2 Pursuant to his statutory discretion 3 the trial judge made the pre-
sentence report available to counsel for the defendant and the government. Dur-
ing the discussion of the report at the sentencing hearing the defendant denied the
allegations noted above, but offered no evidence in rebuttal. The court, aware of
the seriousness of the information set forth in the report, nevertheless considered
itself bound to accept it as prima facie valid. The rationale was that
when statements are made categorically as they are made here, the Court
has no alternative, in the face of contrary factual information, rather than
simply a vehement denial, but to accept as true the information fur-
nished the Court which in turn was obtained by the probation officer from
the officers of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.4
The court then imposed a 20 year sentence upon Weston, .the statutory maximum
for the offense charged.
In an apparent effort to insure every possible opportunity for mitigation of
the report's impact, the trial judge advised defendant's counsel that defendant had
120 days in which to file a motion for modification of sentence. 5 He also advised
that the 120 days could be used to obtain factual data rebutting the presentencc
report, which information should accompany the motion and would be taken into
consideration. Finally, the judge announced that he was requesting the probation
department to produce the factual material used to support the allegations of the
report, and that if it was insufficient, he would modify the sentence on his own
motion. The defendant filed no motion for modification of sentence and the trial
judge subsequently filed an order noting his satisfaction with the supporting mate-
rial provided by the probation department. The order also confirmed the maxi-
mum statutory sentence of 20 years imposed upon defendant, which replaced the
121 U.S.C. § 174 (1970).
2 United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626, 628 (9th Cir. 1971), cart. denied, 404 U.S. 1061
(1972).
3 F. R. CGlM. P. 32(c) (1966) provides, in part, "The court before imposing sentence may dis-
close to the defendant or his counsel all or part of the material contined in the report of the
presentence investigation and afford an opportunity to the defendant or his counsel to comment
thereon."
4 448 F.2d at 629.
r F.R. CIrM. P. 35 (1966).
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five year sentence the judge had originally indicated would be adequate.6 On ap-
peal, the 20 year sentence was vacated on the ground that the defendant had a con-
stitutional right to be sentenced on accurate factual information. It was also held
that rather than having the defendant carry the burden of proving a negative, i.e.,
that the report's allegations were untrue, it was the responsibility of the prosecution
to factually support allegations of the report with data "such as to be persuasive
of the validity of the charge there made."7 The Ninth Circuit remanded the case
for resentencing, relying upon the due process clause of the fifth amendment as
ground for the reversal.
I. INTRODUCTION
The presentence report, which is a brief history and profile of a convicted de-
fendant prepared by a local probation department, has long been a tool used by
some judges in attempting to prescribe an appropriate sentence for an individual
defendant. Neither federal nor state courts require the report for all persons sen-
tenced, and oftentimes a distinction is made on the basis of the severity of the
crime. The report itself is an attempt to reflect objectively a person's background
and thereby acquaint the trial judge with the factors most relevant in considering
what sentence should be imposed, though it usually does not contain a recommen-
dation of a specific sentence. The reports have come under frequent attack by com-
mentators, largely because of the heavy reliance upon unswom hearsay; and their use
has met with minimal judicial limitation. The presentence report typically covers a
defendant's childhood, neighborhood reputation, schooling, employment, prior crim-
inal record, religion, habits, family circumstances, and mental and physical health.8
It is generally prepared by a probation officer in conjunction with public agencies
and other law enforcement personnel that may have been involved in the particular
case. Most often it is read just prior to the sentencing hearing by the trial judge
and used in determining a proper sentence. Though the incorporation of evi-
dentiary procedures into the sentencing hearing has been supported by numerous
commentators, these procedures are presently available only at the judge's personal
discretion in federal jurisdictions. This discretion covers a defendant's request to
read the report, to challenge its contents, to rebut the contents by cross-examina-
ion, to call witnesses, and to introduce evidence.9 However, the result of imple-
menting full procedural and evidentiary requirements at the sentencing stage might
well be to convert it into another trial, a step that the courts are extremely reluc-
tant to take.10
Weston represents a significant departure from the existing procedure in sen-
tencing hearings. The Ninth Circuit held that when there is disclosure of a pre-
sentence report to a defendant and reliance by the trial judge upon that report in
determining what sentence to impose, the defendant has an undeniable right to
a factual determination of allegations of other criminal behavior or misconduct.
The mechanism for such a determination must insure that the prosecution establish,
at least "persuasively," the facts which are used by the trial judge to increase a sen-
6448 F.2d at 629-30.
7Id. at 634.
8 Levin, Toward a More Enlightened Sentencing Procedure, 45 NEB. L REV. 499, 504
(1966).
9 See generally Note, Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentencing for Felony, 81 HAV.
L REV. 821 (19(8); Note, Disclosure of Presentence Reports: A Constitutional Right to Rebut
Adverse Information by Cross-Examination, 3 RUTGERS CAEDEN LJ. 111 (1971).
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tence beyond that which would have been imposed had such allegations not been
made. Further, a court's judgment as to the persuasiveness of proof is subject
to judicial review. The need for such procedures has been recognized by courts
and commentators alike. The rationale of Weston is s;mply that a person should
not be given an increased sentence on the basis of criminal activity, that was neither
alleged nor proven at the trial of the crime for which he was convicted.
The existence of a constitutional guarantee to a factual determination of crimes
and misconduct alleged in a presentence report and relied upon by the judge in
sentencing has never before received judicial sanction. Constitutional standards
safeguarding procedures prior and subsequent to the adjudicatory stage have finally
been applied to sentencing, which is arguably one of the most important non-
adjudicatory steps in the criminal process. It is difficult to imagine anything that is
more important to a defendant -who has been found guilty than the determination
of what specific penalty will follow his conviction. A combination of a trial
judge's discretion in the length, of sentences to be imposed and the fact that the
defendant is not legally entitled to know the contents of the presentence report
relied upon by the judge in determining the sentence can only lead to justifiable
apprehension on the part of the defendant. The real damage, however, lies in the
injustice done to the defendant when the undisclosed presentence report is mate-
rially false, a fact which neither he nor the trial judge may ever know. Federal
sentencing procedure does not require the judge to reveal any allegations of a pre-
sentence report, criminal or otherwise, nor does it require him to disclose to what
degree, if any, he relied upon the report in deciding on an appropriate sentence.
Given this situation, mathematical probability would suggest that many defendants
have received excessive sentences because of simple mistakes, however innocent, in
the preparation of presentence reports. Similarly, a probation officer could in good
faith report damaging accounts of the defendant which were completely fabricated
(for whatever reason) by the people to whom the officer spoke while preparing the
report.
The potential for injustice is obvious, and Weston by no means cures all the de-
fects of the present system. It does deal, however, with what is probably the area
most seriously in need of attention. Information in a presentence report regarding
existing, but thus far unprosecuted, criminal activity is the surest way, aside from
prior criminal convictions, to guarantee that a defendant will get a sentence in
excess of the statutory minimum. Ideally, any defendant receiving more than a
minimum sentence would be told why, and the record would reflect the reasons
for purposes of appeal. The Ninth Circuit did not reach that point, but it did
hold that if there is disclosure of the presentence report and if allegations regard-
ing other criminal activity are relied upon by the judge for the purpose of increas-
ing the sentence, then the defendant has a constitutional right to a determination
(presumably at an evidentiary hearing) of whether or not such allegations are in
fact true. Given the right to such a determination, several collateral issues invite
analysis for purposes of classifying its precise dimensions: (1) whether such a
right assumes or even requires that the defendant have a right of access to the pre-
sentence report; (2) whether the scope and nature of the right to be sentenced only
upon factually accurate data is limited in any significant way; and (3) whether the
constitution prohibits the defendant from being required to carry the burden of
proof.
II. DIsCRETIONARY DisCLOSURn AFTER WESTON
The -most striking part of the Weston opinion may well be its omission of dis-
cussion concerning the fact that disclosure of presentence reports is entirely optional.
[Vol. 33
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This creates a procedural anomaly in that there is now a right to prohibit the in-
creasing of sentences based upon presentence reports which are not "persuasive,"
but that right accrues only to those defendants to whom the report has been dis-
dosed. The question results from the fact that there is no constitutional right of
disclosure of presentence reports, disclosure being an opportunity for a convicted
person to hear and perhaps see the contents of the report being used by the trial
judge. In fact, the discretionary power of federal judges to disclose is not fre-
quently exercised,"1 and only a few states have elevated disclosure to the status of
a right.'2  It is improbable that the Weston court would simply assume that such a
right exists in all cases, and it is equally implausible to suppose that this court rec-
ognized such a right by implication. This is true both because a holding of
such significance probably would not be made without some reference to the author-
ity or constitutional ground supporting it, and because of the continuing contro-
versy surrounding the federal rule as to whether disclosure should be mandatory or
discretionary. 13  Moreover, Weston cannot be used as authority for a proposi-
tion to which it does not even allude, much less discuss. A distinction must, there-
fore, be made between situations of voluntary disclosure, in which a judge rec-
ognizes the requirements of accuracy and persuasiveness, and those situations in
which a judge chooses not to disclose the report. This implies, however, that a
right to accuracy and factual determination can only exist subsequent to disclosure,
and that if a particular trial judge chooses to withhold the contents of the report,
the requirement of persuasive validity becomes meaningless and the convicted per-
son may be sentenced without regard to what may be erroneous in the report.
The most reasonable interpretations of the Weston court's omitting any mention
of disclosure are either that a right of accuracy exists only when the trial judge ac-
tually discloses the report, or that when a judge increases a sentence in at least
partial reliance upon the presentence report, the report must be disclosed to the
defendant who then becomes entitled to a factual determination of disputed allega-
tions. The latter construction is obviously much broader, but seems to follow from
the emphasis the court places upon the change in sentences in Weston from five to
20 years, solely because of the allegations in the report. The issue of whether
or not Weston represents a limited right of disclosure involves several considera-
tions. The trial judge originally indicated that a five year sentence would be ap-
propriate and acknowledged his subsequent xeliance upon the presentence report
A difficulty may arise in distinguishing those situations in which the report ac-
tually influences the length of the sentence but the judge does not make that fact
known, from those in which it does not. Ideally, there might be a rule to the ef-
fect of "disclosure whenever the sentence exceeds that which is normally given in
a similar situation," but in light of all the extrajudicial factors that influence a par-
ticular judge, and given the disparity in sentences that are given to similarly situ-
ated defendants, such a rule would probably be of limited utility. Without a more
explicit statement of a limited right of disclosure, however, it would be unwise to
assume that Weston stands conclusively for such a right. The resolution of that
issue will have to await subsequent cases involving the specific issue.
III. PROHIBrriNG SENTENCES BASED ON MSINFORMATION
The Supreme Court has never ruled directly on the question of a convicted
L Conference Papers on Disoovery in Federal Criminal Cases, 33 F.R.D. 101, 125-27 (1963).
32 See, e.g., the cases dted in note 50 infra,
3 FED. R. CminL P. 322, Advisory Comm. Note at 64-66 (Prelim. Draft of Proposed Amend.
1970).
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person's right to be sentenced only upon the valid or undisputed aspects of a pre.
sentence report. Though early federal cases might have suggested a poor prog-
nosis for such a proposition, policy and dicta in recent Supreme Court cases, to-
gether with lower court decisions on the subject, indicate increasing judicial ap-
proval of the idea. The most noted case dealing with a sentencing hearing is
Williams v. New York, 14 a murder case in which the jury found the defendant
guilty and recommended life imprisonment, but the trial judge imposed the death
sentence, relying in part upon a specious presentence report. The report was para-
phrased and disclosed to the defendant and his counsel, neither of whom chal-
lenged it. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, carefully distinguishing the
applicability of the constitutional rights of notice of charge and confrontation of
adverse witnesses to the adjudicatory stage and not to the sentencing process. 16
After generally discussing the value and need for presentence reports, the care
taken in their preparation, and the penal objectives they serve, the Court concluded
that a judge in a sentencing hearing is not restricted to the information received in
open court. It noted, "The due process clause should not be treated as a device for
freezing the evidential procedure of sentencing in the mold of trial procedure." 10
Courts of appeal are extremely reluctant to review the length of sentences fall-
ing within statutory limits, but Williams, though cited as authority for such a prop-
osition, does not actually hold that. Despite the broadness of the language, it is
more frequently distinguished than it is followed. Of particular note in Williams
are the facts that however specious the report, no general or specific challenge was
made at the time of disclosure, and that the Supreme Court did not find the report
to be inaccurate. What Williams clearly does stand for is the proposition that due
process does not indude extending procedural and evidentiary rules into the sen-
tencing process. That is far short of saying that misinformation, though objected
to during disclosure, may nevertheless be used.
Though Williams seems to imply that rights in the sentencing hearing are
severely limited, a case just prior to it, Townsend v. Btirke,17 held that a judg-
ment would be vacated when the presentence report contained allegations that were
materially untrue and the defendant was without counsel. Petitioner Townsend
was read a presentence report that listed crimes for which he was tried and found
not guilty, but the charges were treated by the trial judge as convictions.1 s The
Supreme Court decided that the "uncounseled defendant was either overreached by
the prosecution's submission of misinformation to the court or was prejudiced by
the court's own misreading of the record."' 9 The grounds for reversal were an in-
accurate report disclosed to a defendant who did not object and who was without
counsel. The presence of counsel in Williams dearly distinguishes it from Town-
send, but the crucial issue remaining is whether misinformation alone is sufficient
for reversal, assuming the presence of counsel. If the Court in lillia;ms had ac-
tually found that the presentence report was false, it could be assumed that a lack
of counsel was requisite to reversal; but no such finding was made.
There is some language in Townsend suggesting that the reversal turned more
14337 U.S. 241 (1949).
151d. at 245-46.
161d. at 251.
'7 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
Is The Supreme Court indicated that the sentencing record was not sufficiently clear so as to
permit a finding of either "carelessness" or "foul play," or whether the fault was that of the
prosecution, probation department, or the judge. Id. at 740.
19Id.
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on the absence of counsel than on a factually inaccurate presentence report. The
Court summarized its rationale by saying, "It is the careless or designed pro-
nouncement of sentence on a foundation so extensively and materially false, which
the prisoner had no opportunity to correct by the services which counsel would
provide, that renders the proceedings lacking in due process. ' -0  Of course, the ab-
sence of counsel would not alone invalidate a sentence because the right to coun-
sel at trial was not recognized until 196321 and not found applicable to the sen-
tencing hearing until 1967.22 However, one is constrained to ask at this point
why the presence of counsel should make a difference. Apparently the Court felt
that counsel would advise the defendant to challenge the inaccurate information
in the report, since the defendant himself is the only one who can really assess
the validity of the information. But, if this is so and, if the defendant challenges
the report on his own, then the need for counsel no longer exists and what remains
is a constitutional right to be sentenced only on accurate factual data relating to
the report. To suppose that one could be sentenced on misinformation which he
challenged at the time of disclosure simply because counsel was available to advise
him that he ought to challenge it is to distort severely the import of Townsend.
Now that a right to counsel at the sentencing stage exists, it would be somewhat
ludicrous to assume that there is no longer a need for factual accuracy in presen-
tence reports.
Support for this conclusion may be drawn from other Supreme Court cases, some
lower court holdings, and the general policy considerations underlying both. Es-
pecially germane is the case of North Carolina v. Pearce,23 in which petitioner
challenged the constitutionality of receiving a longer sentence at the second trial on
a charge for which a previous conviction had been set aside by a higher court.
The analogy with Weston is striking; both questioned the kind of information that
may be properly considered by a trial judge in determining the appropriate sen-
tence in a given case. Weston concerned allegations of widespread narcotics in-
volvement, and Pearce dealt with the fact that a higher court had reversed the case
on appeal and the defendant had been convicted again at a second trial. The Su-
preme Court said with regard to petitioner Pearce:
Whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after
a new trial, the reasons for his doing so must affirmatively appear. Those
reasons must be based upon objective information concerning identifi-
able conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the
original sentencing proceeding. And the factual data upon which the in-
creased sentence is based must be made part of the record, so that the
constitutional legitimacy of the increased sentence may be fully reviewed
on appeal 2 4
If a sentence upon a new trial may only be increased in conformance with the above
procedure, it is difficult to imagine what reasoning would permit the original sen-
tence to be increased based upon a factually defective presentence report.
Equally persuasive support may be derived from the Supreme Court's approach
in Kent v. United States,2 5 a case dealing with the application of due process to the
20 Id. at 741.
2 1 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
22 Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
23395 U.S. 711 (1969).
24 Id. at 726.
25 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
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waiving of juvenile court jurisdiction and transfer to adult criminal court. In dls-
cussing the hearing at which the decision of waiver is made, the Court concluded
that it is a decision of tremendous consequence, and hence cannot be reached
"without ceremony, without hearing, without effective assistance of counsel, without
a statement of reasons"2 6 and that "as a condition to a valid waiver order, peti-
tioner was entitled to a hearing, including access by his counsel to the social rec-
ords and probation or similar reports which presumably are considered by the
court ...."27 A decision of "tremendous consequence" relates to what the Court
calls "a 'critically important' action determining vitally important statutory rights
of the juvenile." 28  The analysis lends itself well to lW'eston, assuming that the
underlying purpose of affording counsel an opportunity to see the social and proba-
tion records is to insure the accuracy of the contents. What must be established
is that sentencing is a "critically important" stage in the adult criminal process.
Two factors strongly support this conclusion: (1) the similarity of extending a
sentence from the statutory minimum to the maximum (as in Veston) with waiv-
ing juvenile court jurisdiction, which increases a juvenile's potential period of in-
carceration from until his majority to the adult sentence for the particular crime;20
and (2) the Supreme Court has already demonstrated that sentencing is sufficiently
critical to require the presence of counsel. The import of the analogy is the sig-
nificance the Supreme Court attached to the use of extrajudicial records and,
implicitly, the importance of their containing accurate, factual data.8 0
Numerous courts of appeal have undertaken an examination of the proper 'role of
a presentence report. As long ago as 1955 the Fifth Circuit cited Townsend in
Smith v. United Statess ' held that representations as to prior offenses supplied to
the court by an agent of the FBI could not be used as the basis for imposing a harsher
sentence unless the state could prove that the defendant was guilty of the crimes
so alleged, the commission of which the defendant denied. In United Slates ex.
rel. Jackson v. Myers32 the Third Circuit vacated a judgment based upon an errone-
ous presentence report which indicated that the defendant had been found guilty of
three prior crimes when, in fact, he had only been convicted of one. Regarding the
fact that the defendant had been represented by counsel, the court said:
Recognizing that Townsend rests upon this dual basis [error and lack of
counsel], we nevertheless think that the facts of the present case entitle
26d. at 554.
27 Id. at 557.
2Sld. at 556.
29 Kent represented this situation, wherein a juvenile of 17 could be held only until age 21
regardless of the crime, but a waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction meant possible imprisonment
for life under the adult penal system. The converse of this principle is the one most often noted
for producing inequity under the juvenile law system. A juvenile found guilty of what consti-
rutes a misdemeanor under the adult criminal code, hence punishable by perhaps six months at
the maximum, may nevertheless be incarcerated until his majority, conceivably a period of many
years.
30 It should be noted that Kent is perhaps the best precedent to argue for a constitutional
right of disclosure of presentence reports. Everything that can be said in justifying disclosure
at a juvenile court waiver hearing applies with equal force to the defendant who stands before a
judge who is in possession of a probation report, the contents of which are unknown to the de-
fendant. Indeed, the latitude allowed a trial judge in sentencing muikes it just as critical as the
waiver hearing in which a juvenile may be made subject to senten:es governing the crime of
which he is accused. For a recent judicial assertion of a constitutional right of disclosure, see
United States v. Dockery, 447 F.2d 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Wright, C.J., dissenting).
81223 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1955).
32 374 F.2d 707 (3d Cir. 1967).
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the appellant to relief. The Supreme Court saw the wrong incurred as
careless or designed sentencing on the basis of materially untrue facts and
assumed that such injustice would normally be precluded by the presence
of counsel. This, of course, is premised upon the effective protection by
counsel at this juncture, not merely his physical attendance.33
The same result was reached in United States ex. rel. Brown v. Rundle,3 4 in which
petitioner's sentence was vacated because it was based, in part, upon an admission
alleged to have been made by petitioner to the probation officer, contained in the
latter's -report to the trial judge, and denied by petitioner. The appeals court
ruled that such an allegation must either be subject to a defendant's rights of con-
frontation and cross-examination or disregarded by the trial judge in sentencing.3 5
And where the trial judge was either misinformed or confused about a defendant's
criminal record and it affected sentencing, the judgment was vacated and a new
hearing for obtaining the facts was ordered in United States v. A!acoIm3 by the
Second Circuit.
Both the rationale supporting Townsend and the treatment given it by later
federal cases strongly suggest that there is a constitutional right to the exclusion of
misinformation disclosed by the trial judge in sentencing. No reasonable penal or
social objective would be served by allowing a judge to rely upon disputed facts
that are not even subject to the rules of evidence. While the question of whether
or not a limited right of disclosure still exists, it is very unlikely that that which is
disclosed and challenged for validity may be properly used for increasing a sentence.
IV. CHALLENGING THE REPORT: DEGREE AND BURDEN OF PROOF
Aside from whether Weston actually stands for a limited right of disclosure in
addition to the right to accuracy in a disclosed report, a more difficult question is
presented when the validity of the report is actually challenged. Questions about a
defendant's past criminal record can be resolved to the satisfaction of all parties in-
volved by reference to the official sources of such information. But allegations in-
volving reputation, character, and otherwise unverified extra-legal activity present
far more serious problems. In fact, this was the essence of Weston, in which the
defendant objected to all of the presentence report's assertions of extensive drug in-
volvement and exhorbitant profits from the sale of drugs.37 The defendant
said that the report's description of her was without any factual basis, and her
counsel told the court that he could not conceive of what kind of investigation he
could make to disprove a statement by an unknown informer that his client was a
large-scale heroin dealer.38 The trial judge followed the accepted federal procedure
in dealing with such a dispute and informed the defendant that the court had to
assume the truth of the facts as stated in the presentence report in the absence of
contrary factual information.39 In effect, the court ascribed prima fade to the docu-
33 d. at 710.
34 417 F.2d 282 (3d Cir. 1969).
351d. at 285.
8 432 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1970).
37 448 F.2d 626, 628 (9th Cir. 1971).
38 ld. at 629.
39 Id. It can reasonably be urged that the trial judge went to the limit of fairness under whit
he perceived as proper evidentiary rules in a sentencing hearing by reminding counsel of the
availability of a motion for modification of sentence and volunteering to reduce the sentence on
his own motion if unsatisfied with the report's conclusions after a personal inspection of the daa
used in its compilation. The appeals court seemed to a:knowledge this by noting thar; in fact,
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ment validity and invited the defendant to accept the burden of disproving that
'which it contained. In other words, the burden was thrown upon the defendant to
come forward with something other than a general denial to refute what the proba-
tion officer had -asserted. If the defendant had done so, presumably the judge
would either have disregarded the disputed information in his determination of the
sentence or resolved the factual issue against one of the parties.
Weston changes two very fundamental aspects of this traditional burden and
degree of proof procedure. First, the presentence report is no longer prima fade
valid with the ordinary requirement of disproof by the defendant, but rather the
burden of proof for any material fact that is challenged remains upon the prosecu-
tion. Thus an allegation of extensive drug dealing, if denied, is a fact for the pros-
ecution to establish, not for the defense to disprove. Second, there is a degree of
proof which the prosecution must satisfy with respect to the report. A judge "may
not -rely upon the information contained in the presentence report unless it is ampli-
lied by information such as to be persuasive of the validity of the charge there
made."40 It is difficult to translate the court's formulation into orthodox standards
of proof, though it is reasonable to assume that it is something less than beyond
a reasonable doubt and perhaps even less than a preponderance. What is clear is
that it is something more than the unsworn memorandum of an FBI agent telating
his conversations with an informant who implicated the defendant, as was the case
in W/eston,41 and which was used as sole support for the charges made in the pre-
sentence report noted above.42
The court's reasoning with respect to placing the burden of proof upon the
prosecution and requiring a standard of "persuasiveness" is grounded in due pro-
cess. There can be no doubt of the intent of the court, as evidenced by its char-
acterization of the traditional rule of requiring a defendant to disprove the report
as "a great miscarriage of justice." 43  What is not convincingly demonstrated,
however, -is that the change brought about by Weston is constitutionally com-
pelled. All of the precedent cited in the opinion is directed to the proposition that
a sentence based on misinformation should be vacated, but no mention is made of
burden or degree of proof. This is not unusual, though, since there is no conclu-
sive right of disclosure, and consequently appellate courts have never considered
the question. And when the report is disclosed, the defendant must still challenge
it and show that, despite its questionable validity, the trial judge relied upon it for
increasing the sentence imposed. As a result of this, W'eston justifies the change by
pointing out the inherent unfairness in using the unsworn statements of an unknown
informer to increase the length of a sentence, as compared with the scrupulous care
given to procedural and evidentiary rules in the trial itself.44 As morally appeal-
the defendant could have spoken to the four alleged distributors named in the report, demon.
strated that she had not made frequent trips to Mexico and Arizona for illegal purposes, and
shown that her personal worth in no way supported the estimates of drug profits contained in
the report.
40 Id. at 634.
41 Id. at 630.
42 One ramification of the court's standard could be to require judges, whenever a presentence
report is challenged, to examine all of the factual data that contributed to the report. Since re-
ports are generally framed in a conclusory fashion, for example the defendant is a well known
drug user, a judge would be compelled to examine whatever background material was used to
reach that conclusion before he could be persuaded of the validity of such a charge.




ing as this may be,45 it will survive only if accompanied by a showing that the
procedure is sufficiently unfair so as to constitute a violation of due process of law.
The issue of burden and degree of proof may be sharpened by stating it in its
alternative form, that is, whether or not it is unconstitutional to put the burden of
proof upon the defendant in a criminal proceeding. Thus, it may be seen that
questions of confrontation, cross-examination, and introduction of evidence are
constitutionally distinct from whether the state may place the burden of proving
something other than actual guilt upon the defendant.
The logical starting point for such a determination is Leland v. Oregon.5
This case involved an Oregon statute which required a defendant who pleaded in-
sanity as a defense to prove the fact of his insanity beyond a reasonable doubt.
In upholding the power of a state to place the burden of proof of insanity upon
the defendant, a divided Court said that the existence of a fairer or wiser method
was immaterial and that they would not interfere with Oregon's policy because it
did not violate "generally accepted concepts of basic standards of justice." 47  The
case squarely holds that a defendant may be required to carry the burden of proof
for elements other than guilt, and in this instance required proof beyond a reason-
able doubt. Regarding this quantum of proof, the Court noted that while many
states have a similar rule requiring only proof by a preponderance, they saw "no
practical difference of such magnitude as to be significant in determining the con-
stitutional question." 48 A somewhat analogous state practice which has not yet re-
ceived Supreme Court consideration is a rule in about 15 states requiring proof
of the elements of self defense by the defendant by a preponderance." Again
the concept of an affirmative defense is distinguishable from the elements of the
crime which the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. The defense must be
established by the defendant (who still carries a presumption of innocence) in order
to be acquitted on the basis of the justifiable defense.
Support for Weston's finding of unconstitutionality, aside from the policy argu-
ment mentioned, may be taken from some recent Supreme Court cases.w In Spech
v. Patterson5l a sentence under the Colorado Sex Offenders' Act52 of indetermi-
nate length was reversed because it was based on a conviction under an indecent
liberties statute53 that carried a maximum sentence of 10 years. The sentence was
made without notice or full hearing, hence the defendant was essentially given a
sentence under a statute for which no violation had been shown. The Court said
45 The unfairness argument advanced by the court has been enlarged by commentators to in-
dude the unreasonableness of expecting probation officers who prepare the reports to be infal-
lible, to be able to separate input data that is improperly prejudicial from that which is objec-
tive, and to avoid imparting some of their own bias into the report in all cases.
46 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
47 Id. at 799.
1d. at 798.
49 This is oftentimes not a statutory procedure. See, e.g., Ezell v. State, 119 Ohio St. 39,
162 N.E. 106 (1928); Szalkai v. State, 96 Ohio S. 36, 117 N.E. 12 (1916); Silvus v. State, 22
Ohio St 90 (1871).
50 A recent New Jersey case, State v. Kunz, 55 NJ. 128, 259 A.2d 895 (1969), held that a
defendant has a right to disclosure and that challenged information had to be verified, and a
later case, State v. Home, 56 N.J. 372, 267 A.2d 1 (1970), held that if the report was chal-
lenged, the state had the burden of introducing supporting evidence, but both cases rested on
nonconstitutional grounds.
51386 U.S. 605 (1967).
52 CLO REv. STAT. §§ 39-19-1 to 10 (1963).
5 3 COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-2-32 (1963).
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that to be sentenced under the second statute required "a new finding of fact that
was not an ingredient of the offense charged," 4 the charge being that the de-
fendant either constituted a threat of bodily harm to the public or was an habitual
offender and mentally ill. It would surely seem that Weston requires similar
analysis, since the defendant was given a longer sentence based on a new finding of
fact regarding extensive illegal drug dealing. Although the increased sentence did
not come under a different statute, the net effect of increasing actual incarceration
based on facts that were not a part of the proof required for the conviction is iden-
tical in each case. The remedy in each case is the same; have a hearing in which
the facts that the state alleges justify the increased sentence be proven. It follows
that the state would be compelled to carry the burden of proof (as indeed they
were in Specht) with regard to such new facts.
In Re Winship,55 a case which decided that juveniles were entitled to proof
beyond a reasonable doubt in establishing guilt of the substantive offense charged,
rather than by a preponderance, also provides some support for Weston. The
court there quoted the dissent in Leland in reaffirming that "[i]t is the duty of
the government to establish . . . guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."56 That dissent,
of course, stood for the proposition that it was unconstitutional to put the burden of
proving insanity upon the defendant. The Court also refined the notion by adding
that the proof could only be achieved through "evidence confined to that which
long experience in the common law tradition, to some extent embodied in the Con-
stitution, has crystallized into rules of evidence consistent with .. . [the beyond
a'reasonable doubt] standard." 57  Those rules of evidence have without exception
reserved the burden of proof of material facts contributing to criminal punishment
to the state. Further support may be inferred from Lego v. Twomey,58 which held
that proof by a preponderance is sufficient to warrant the admission of a con-
fession which the defendant challenged as having been coerced. What is relevant
to Weston is not the standard of proof required, but Tather of whom it is required.
The Court emphasized the role of the state in proving elements of a crime and
avoiding unjust convictions.59 But there is nothing less unjust about being given
a longer sentence on the basis of unproven facts than being given any sentence at
all based on unproven facts. The conspicuous absence of any ,reference to placing
the burden upon the defendant for proving a confession to have been coerced sug-
gests that compelling him to disprove a presentence report would be equally unten-
able.
The ultimate resolution of where the burden lies necessitates a choice between
the precedent for state discretion and the logic of newer cases rejecting such discre-
tion. The changing composition of the Supreme Court6° will no doubt greatly
influence the outcome of any case presenting this issue, should it reach that Court.
64 386 U.S. at 608.
55 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
56 Id. at 362 citing Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
57 397 U.S. at 362 citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
58 40 U.S.L.W. 4135 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1972).
59 The Court in Lego spoke only of the degrees of proof required of the state and did not men-
tion the possibility of any state requiring the defendant to carry a burden of proof in a criminal
case. This might imply that either the Court was unaware of the practice by any state, or it felt
such a procedure to be unconstitutional, hence did not bother to discuss it. The latter inter-
pretation would fully support the position of Weston condemning such a procedure with respect
to presentence reports.
60 It should be noted that Lego was a four to three decision, with the dissent holding for a
higher standard of proof, and with Powell and Rhenquist, JJ., taking no part in the case.
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It would seem, however, that the potential for injustice far outweighs any state
interest that might obtain in shifting the burden of proof at any stage of the crim-
inal process to the defendant. The recent cases discussed above have so held,
and should be regarded as supporting what is surely the fairest approach, and
which is also the one most consistent with our traditional system of criminal jus-
ice.
V. CONCLUSION
Weston contains some far reaching implications, and even a narrow reading of
the opinion reveals substantial areas of change. Following Lego, if the burden
of proof is properly placed upon the state, will "persuasiveness" be a proper stan-
dard, or will it have to be by a preponderance (as the Lego majority held) or even
beyond a reasonable doubt (as the Lego dissent held)? Such a question would
no doubt require litigation of its own to be satisfactorily answered. Another issue
may be the extent to which the trial judge must examine data which supports the
conclusions of the probation officer. Weston asserts that disputed facts must be
found persuasively true before they can be relied upon, which implies that both
the trial court and appellate courts must examine all the relevant underlying docu-
mentation before arriving at a determination of its veracity.
There are a few implications in Weston which could harm future defendants
in similar circumstances. Judges who recognize controversial aspects in a presen-
tence report might exercise their discretion and not disclose any of the report for
fear of challenge and additional evidentiary procedures and delays. So long as dis-
closure remains discretionary, such a possibility will always exist. Also, a judge
might conceal the fact that he is relying upon the report in sentencing or assert
grounds other than the subjective portion of the report for imposing a longer than
usual sentence. But, these dangers exist only because of the lack of a right of dis-
closure. The best counter-argument to them is the ability of the judge to disre-
gard disputed elements of the report in determining the most appropriate sentence
for a given defendant. Moreover, all things considered, these potential abuses de-
tract little, if at all, from the ultimate benefit that Weston confers upon defen-
dants who receive overly severe sentences because they are unable to disprove un-
sworn hearsay statements regarding collateral criminal activity or misconduct.
Regardless of what construction the courts ultimately give to Weston, it is doubt-
ful that -it alone can be relied upon to -reach the fairest method for utilizing pre-
sentence reports. That procedure would be one in which the defendant was
informed of and the record reflected all reasons underlying the imposition of a sen-
tence greater than the statutory minimum. Only then will the dangers surrounding
the use of presentence reports be reduced without derogating from the many
useful functions they serve. The practical difficulties would be slight and the net
effect would be to put the sentencing hearing on a level comparable to the trial it-
self with respect to procedural safeguards. Such a requirement clearly invokes
the spirit, if not the letter, of due process and its emphasis upon guaranteeing fair-
ness throughout the entire criminal process. Weston represents a significant step
towards reducing the abuses of presentence reports insofar as they allege criminal
activity. Recognition of a limited constitutional right to factual determination is
long overdue yet still short of what true justice demands. No person should be able
to compel the incarceration of another beyond what the legislature has determined
is the minimum penalty for a given offense without being required to state reasons
and facts that support the necessity for doing so.
Robert L. Beals
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DAMAGES-JURY INSTRUCTION ON THE TAX-EXEMPT STATUS OF THE PER-
SONAL INJURY AwARD--Domeracki v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 443 F.2d 1245
(3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 883 (1971).
The Internal Revenue Code provides that damages received in personal injury
and wrongful death actions are not to be included in the gross income of the recipi-
ent.' Such damage awards come to the successful plaintiff tax-free, except for that
portion, if any, which represents a prior tax deduction 2
If a jury in a personal injury case is not aware of this exclusion, it might prop-
erly compute the plaintiff's award according to the court's charge on the measure
of damages and then mistakenly add a further amount to offset income taxes on the
award, believing this necessary to compensate the plaintiff for his losses.a The
larger the award, the more significant this increment for nonexistent taxes could be-
come, assuming the jury is aware of the progressiveness of the tax rate structure.
Fearing this possibility, defendants frequently request the court to inform the jury
that the award is not, in fact, taxable.
Domeracki v. Humble Oil and Refining Co.,4 a case presenting the issue of whether
a court should instruct the jury that a personal injury award is not taxable, involved
a personal injury claim by a longshoreman against a shipowner. A federal district
court jury found liability and awarded damages in the amount of $270,982. 5  On
appeal,6 Humble argued, among other things, that the trial court had erred in re-
fusing to instruct the jury as follows:
I charge you, as a matter of law, that any award made to the plaintiff
in this case, if any is made, is not income to the plaintiff within the mean-
ing of the federal income tax law. Should you find that plaintiff is en.
titled to an award of damages, then you are to follow the instructions al.
ready given to you by this Court in measuring those damages, and in no
event should you either add to or subtract from that award on account of
federal income taxes.1
Judge Aldisert, writing for a unanimous Third Circuit, analyzed the question in
the following manner. (1) In a personal injury action, the plaintiff should be corn
pensated for his losses. (2) This end is furthered when the trial court properly in-
structs the jury, on the measure of damages, and the jury follows the instructions.
(3) There is widespread public awareness that recipients of large sums of money,
such as winners of sweepstakes and television contests, are required to pay income
taxes on their winnings. (4) Few members of the general public are aware that
personal injury awards are exempt from the federal income tax. (5) It is therefore
'IlNT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 104(a) (2). The exclusion applies to damages received in
settlement of claims as well as to awards.
2 Id. Punitive damages and interest on the judgment however, are, generally taxable. Cut.
ler, Taxation of the Proceeds of Litigation, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 470 (1957).
This article is concerned with the ordinary elements of damage:,, such as past loss of earn-
ings (between the time the injury was suffered and the time of trial), loss of future earning
capacity, medical expenses, pain and suffering, and damages unique to wrongful death actions.
The applicable state and local income tax statutes may contain a similar exclusion.
3 This problem does not, of course, arise in non-jury trials.
4312 F. Supp. 374 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd, 443 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 883 (1971).
S 312 F. Supp. at 375, 376 n.1.
6 Domeracki v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 443 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 883 (1971).
7 Id. at 1248-49.
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logical to assume that there exists a widespread belief, among those who have rea-
son to think about the issue, that personal injury awards are taxed. (6) It is pos-
sible that, after having computed the plaintiff's damages pursuant to the court's
instructions, the jury, mistakenly believing that the award is taxable, might add a
further amount to the award so that the plaintiff will retain the original amount
after paying income tax on the award. (7) The instruction in question would dis-
pel this mistaken belief and prevent the jury from improperly including in the award
an amount for nonexistent taxes thereon. (8) To the extent that the cautionary
instruction has its desired effect, the result is closer adherence to the court's charge
on the measure of damages, and thus a more just compensation. (9) The objec-
tion, that such an instruction would inject into the trial complex income tax com-
putations in determining the plaintiff's loss of past earnings or future earning ca-
pacity, arises from confusing two separate and distinct questions. The first is
whether the defendant may properly introduce evidence of the income taxes which
the plaintiff would have paid on his lost past earnings and future income had he
not been injured. The second is whether the jury should be instructed that the
award itself is not taxable. None of the arguments against the introduction of tax
evidence during the trial is pertinent to the latter question. (10) Therefore, the
district court should have given the requested instruction.8 Thus the Third Circuit
held that
in personal injuries actions the trial courts in this Circuit must, in the fu-
ture, upon request by counsel, instruct the jury that any award will not be
subject to federal income taxes and that the jury should not, therefore, add
or subtract taxes in fixing the amount of any award 9
The reasoning of the Third Circuit in Domeracki appears sound, perhaps even
incontrovertible. Yet, as far as this writer can discover, of all the courts which have
previously considered the issue, only the Supreme Court of Missouri has held that
the trial judge must give a cautionary instruction on the tax-exempt nature of the
personal injury award when requested to do so.10 A few courts have held that it
is not error to give such an instruction when requested by the defendant to do so."
81d. at 1249-51.
91d. at 1251. Humble did not, however, reap the fruits of its victory, at least in this par-
ticular action, since the court made its holding prospective only and affirmed the judgment of
the district court. The court gave two reasons for applying its holding only to future cases.
First, there was no evidence that the jury in this case increased the award from a mistaken belief
that it was taxable. Second, since the holding was without precedent in the federal courts, the
trial court did not err in refusing to give the instruction when it was requested. Id. at 1252.
Humble petitioned for, and was denied, a writ of certiorari on the issue of prospective applica-
tion alone. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 1, Domeracki v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 404
U.S. 883 (1971).
10 Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 346, 251 S.W.2d 42, 45 (1952). There is dic-
tum to this effect in Texas & N.O. Ry. v. Pool, 263 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954). No
court has suggested, much less held, that trial courts must give such an instruction in cases in
which the defendant has not requested it.
1Anderson v. United Air Lines, 183 F. Supp. 97, 97-98 (S.D. Cal. 1960); Stager v. Fla.
E.C. Ry., 163 So.2d 15, 18 (Ct. App. Fla. 1964), cert. denied, 174 So. 2d 540 (Fla.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 878 (1965); Poirier v. Shireman, 129 So.2d 439,44445 (Ct. App. Ea. 1961).
In the Anderson case, the court pointed out that the instruction was particularly desirable in
view of the circumstances. Among other things, the decedent had been in a high tax bracet,
and the jurors were particularly sensitive to the subject of income taxes, since the period for
filing tax returns had recently ended. Anderson v. United Air Lines, supra at 98. Cf. Gault
v. Poor Sisters, 375 F.2d 539 (6th Cir. 1967), in which the jury, during deliberations habd
inquired of the trial judge whether the award would be taxable. The judge instructed the
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The vast majority of courts have held, however, that refusad to give the instruction
is not error.12 A few of these courts have indicated that a trial court may properly
give the instruction,13 but many state that the instruction is never proper.14
Since the Third Circuit departed from considerable precedent, an examination
jury that the award would not be taxable, and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held
that the instruction in response to the inquiry was proper. Id. at 548.
12These courts include the United States Court of Appeals for the Second, Fifth and Sixth
Circuits. Thus the Doameracki decision has created a division of the circuits on this issue. Greco
v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 464 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1972) (post-Domeracki); Cunningham v.
Bay Drilling Co., 421 F.2d 1398, 1399 (5th Cir. 1970); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v.
Wilkerson, 327 F.2d 997, 998 (5th Cir. 1964); Payne v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 309 F.2d 546,
550 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 827 (1963); McWeeney v. N.Y., N.H. & H.RIL,
282 F.2d 34, 39 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960); N.Y.C.R.R. v. Del ch, 252 F.2d
522, 527 (6th Cir. 1958) (involved a badly drawn, cryptic instruction); Altemys v. Pa. R.R.,
32 F.R.D. 7, 8 (D. Del. 1963) (dictum); Moffa v. Perkins Trucking Co., 200 F. Supp. 183,
189 (D. Conn. 1961); Combs v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 135 F. Supp. 750, 757 (N.D.
Iowa 1955); Mitchell v. Emblade, 80 Ariz. 398, 405, 298 P.2d 1034, 1038 (1956) (obscurely
phrased instruction); Henninger v. Southern P., 250 Cal. App. 2d 872, 879-80, 59 Cal. Rptr.
76, 81 (Ct. App. 1967); Atherly v. MacDonald, Young & Nelson, Inc., 142 Cal. App. 2d 575,
589, 298 P.2d 700, 709 (Ct. App. 1956) (instruction evidently directed jury to decrease award
because award was not taxable); Gorham v. Farmington Motor Inn, Inc., 159 Con, 576, 582,
271 A.2d 94, 97 (1970); Atlantic C.L.R.R. v. Braz. 182 So. 2d 491, 495 (Ct. App. Fla. 1966);
Atlantic C.L.R.R. v. Brown, 93 Ga. App. 805, 807, 92 S.E.2d 874, 876 (Ct. App. 1956);
Kawamoto v. Yasutake, 49 Hawaii 42, 51, 410 P.2d 976, 981 (1966); Hall v. Chicago & NW.
Ry., 5 Ill.2d 135, 151, 125 N.E.2d 77, 85-86 (1955) (defendant attempted to inform jury
that award was tax-exempt in his closing argument rather than by instruction); Highshew v.
Kushto, 235 Ind. 505, 507-08, 134 N.E.2d 555, 556 (1956); Spencer v. Martin K. Eby Constr.
Co., 186 Kan. 345, 353, 350 P.2d 18, 24 (1960); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mattingly, 318
S.W.2d 844, 848 (Ky. 1958); Guerra v. W.J. Young Constr. Co., 165 So.2d 882, 887 (Ct.
App. La.), cert. denied, 167 So.2d 676 (La. 1964); Briggs v. Chicago G.W. Ry., 248 Minn.
418, 432, 80 N.W.2d 625, 636 (1957); Bowyer v. Te-Co, Inc., 310 S.W.2d 892, 897 (Mo.
1958) (variant instruction from that approved in Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 251
S.W.2d 42 (1952); Bracy v. Great N.R.R., 136 Mont. 65, 75, 343 P.2d 848, 853 (1959) (in-
struction would have also directed jury not to include in award an amount for court costs or at-
torney's fees); Crecelius v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 144 Neb. 394, 403, 13 N.W.2d 627, 632
(1944) (trial judge had refused to answer jury's question, which had arisen during deliberation,
whether award was taxable); Maus v. New York, C. & L.R.R., 165 Ohio St. 281, 284-85, 135
N.E.2d 253, 255-56 (1956) (vaguely worded instruction); Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R. v. Kinsey,
372 P.2d 863, 866-67 (Okla. 1962); Dixie Feed & Seed Co. v. Byrd, 52 Tenn. App. 619, 627-28,
376 S.W.2d 745, 749 (Ct. App. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 878 (1964); Missouri-K.-T.R.R.
v. McFerrin, 156 Tex. 69, 90, 291, S.W.2d 931, 945 (1956); Crum v. Ward, 146 W. Va. 421,
444, 122 S.E.2d 18, 31 (1961); Behringer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 6 Wis.2d 595,
603, 95 N.W.2d 249, 254 (1959) (arguably misleading instruction); Hardware Mut. Ca. Co.
v. Harry Crow & Son, Inc., 6 Wis.2d 396,407-08,94 N.W.2d 577, 583 (1959).
13 McWeeney v. N.Y., N.H. & H.R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 39 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 364 U.S.
870 (1960); Atherly v. MacDonald, Young & Nelson, Inc., 142 Cal. App. 2d 575, 589, 298
P.2d 700, 709 (Ct. App. 1956); Atlantic C.L.R.R. v. Braz, 182 So.2d 491, 495 (Ct. App. Fla,
1966); Behringer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 6 Wis.2d 595, 604, 95 N.W.2d 249, 254
(1959).
14 Atlantic C.LR.R. v. Brown, 93 Ga. App. 805, 807, 92 S.E.2d 874, 876 (Ct. App. 1956);
Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 111. 2d 135, 150-52, 125 N.E.2d 77, 85-86 (1955); Highshew
v. Kushto, 235 Ind. 505, 507-08, 134 N.E.2d 555, 556 (1956); Spencer v. Martin K. Eby
Constr. Co., 186 Kan. 345, 350-54, 350 P.2d 18, 22-25 (1960); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mat-
tingly, 318 S.W.2d 844, 848 (Ky. 1958); Briggs v. Chicago G.W. Ry., 248 Minn. 418, 432,
80 N.W.2d 625, 636 (1957); Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R. v. Kinsey, 372 P.2d 863, 866-67 (Okla,
1962); Missouri-K.-T.R.R. v. McFerrin, 156 Tex. 69, 90, 291 S.W.2d 931, 945 (1956); Crum
v. Ward, 146 W. Va. 421, 442-44, 122 S.E.2d 18, 30-31 (1961). As far as this writer can
discover, only one court has held that a trial court committed reversible error in giving the in-
struction. Wagner v. Illinois C.R.R., 7 II. App. 2d 445, 447, 129 N.E.2d 771, 772 (Ct.
App. 1955).
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of the arguments rejected in Domeracki is necessary to a fair appraisal of this de-
cision. The following analysis of the several arguments advanced by courts against
the giving of the cautionary instruction will, it is submitted, demonstrate the sound-
ness of the Domeracki rule. First, it is apparent that some courts' 5 have disap-
proved the cautionary instruction because they have confused the issue of the ad-
missibility of evidence concernig income taxes on the plaintiffs past lost earnings
and hypothetical future earnings with the issue of whether the jury should be in-
structed that the award itself is non-taxable.16 The Supreme Court of Indiana, in
discussing a cautionary instruction, said that
Inquiries at a trial into the incidents of taxation in damage suits of the
character we have here, would open up broad and new matters not perti-
nent to the issues involved. Such subject matter would involve intricate
instruction on tax and non-tax liabilities with all the regulations pertinent
thereto. No court could, with any certainty, properly instruct a jury with-
out a tax expert at its side. In our judgment such matters are not a
proper subject for'instruction or argument of counsel. 17
As the court in Domeracki correctly points out, "the considerations relating to the
former issue have no relevance to the second."' 8
Another common objection to the instruction has been stated as follows:
It is a general principle of law that in the trial of a lawsuit the status
of the parties is immaterial. Thus, what the plaintiff does with an award,
or how the defendant acquires the money with which to pay the award, is
of no concern to the court or jury.18
To grant that it is immaterial to a jury that the plaintiff will not have to pay in-
come tax on his award, however, is not to conclude that the jury should remain
15 Henniger v. Southern P., 250 Cal. App. 2d 872, 879-80, 59 Cal. Rptr. 76, 81 (Ct.
App. 1967); Highshew v. Kushto, 235 Ind. 505, 507-08, 134 N.E.2d 555, 556 (1956); Briggs
v. Chicago G.W. Ry., 248 Miin. 418, 432, 80 N.W.2d 625, 636 (1957); Bracy v. Great
N.R.R., 136 Mont. 65, 74, 343 P.2d 848, 853 (1959); Dixie Feed & Seed Co., v. Byrd, 52
Tenn. App. 619, 627-28, 376 S.W.2d 745, 749 (Cr. App. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 878
(1964). See Cunningham v. Bay Drilling Co., 421 F.2d 1398, 1399 (5th Cir. 1970) (per
curiam) (the court cites two cases on point, both with per curiam opinions, and an additional
case which involved only the evidentiary issue); Missouri.K.-T.R.R. v. McFerrin, 156 Tex.
69, 90, 291 S.W.2d 931, 945 (1956).
16 Domeracki v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 443 F.2d 1245, 1250 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 883 (1971); 2 F. HARPER & F. JtAsFs, THE LAw OF TORTS § 25.12 (1956, Supp.
1968); Nordstrom, Income Taxes and Personal Injury Awards, 19 OHIo ST. LJ. 212, 231
(1958); Roettger, The Cautionary Instruction on Income Taxes in Negligence Actions, 18
WAsH & LEE L REV. 1, 2 n.3. (1961).
1 Highshew v. Kushto, 235 Ind. 505, 507-08, 134 N.-2d 555, 556 (1956).
18443 F.2d at 1250-51. The court continued:
The instruction requested in this case would not require the introduction of any ad-
ditional evidence. No reference to any IRS regulation or to any specific statute would
be necessary. No tax expert would need be summoned as a witness. No tax tables
would be hauled into the courtroom. No additional computation would be required.
In brief, such an instruction would not open the trial to matters irrelevant to tradi-
tional issues in personal injury litigation, and thus would in no way complicate the
case or confuse the jury.
Id. at 1251.
'
9 Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 Ill. 2d 135, 151-52, 125 N.E.2d 77, 86 (1955); accord,
Gorham v. Farmington Motor Inn, Inc., 159 Conn. 576, 581, 271 A.2d 94, 97 (1970); At-
lantic C.L.R.R. v. Brown, 93 Ga. App. 805, 807, 92 S.E.2d 874, 876 (Ct App. 1956); Briggs
v. Chicago G.W. Ry., 248 Minn. 418, 431, 80 N.W.2d 625, 636 (1957); Cru v. Ward, 146
W. Va. 421, 442, 122 S.E.2d 18, 30 (1961).
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unaware that this is so. The possibility exists that a jury may consider its mistaken
belief on this point so material that it disregards, innocently or intentionally, the
court's instructions on the proper measure of damages. When presented with a
colorable argument that some juries may increase the damage award to enable the
plaintiff to satisfy a nonexistent income tax liability, a court which replies that the
taxability of the award is none of the jury's business is not helping to solve the
problem, but only denying that a problem exists.
Courts have further reasoned that since the judge has already instructed the jury
on the proper measurement of the plaintiff's damages, and since "by the very na-
ture of the jury system this court cannot indulge the presumption that juries do not
follow the instructions of the courts," 20 an additional instruction to refrain from
including in the award an amount for income taxes thereon is superfluous. In
other words, the charge to the jury to measure the plaintiff's damages according to
a certain formula contains by negative implication the instruction not to deviate
from that formula by ;ncluding in the award an amount for taxes thereon. This
argument, appealing in its logic, would be unassailable if a computer sat in the jury
box, for, being programmed to perform a certain operation, the computer would per-
form that operation and stop; it would not perform an additional step, since to do
so would be inconsistent with its instructions. In contrast, it is entirely possible
that human jurors, oblivious to the negative implication buried in the court's in-'
struction, might disobey that instruction in the belief that they are following it.i
Although a court must, if the jury system is to make sense, presume that the jury
will not intentionally deviate from the instructions on the measure of damages, a
tax-conscious jury might, after properly computing an award, add an amount to
offset supposed income taxes on the award, thereby deviating from the instructions
in an attempt to comply with them by giving the plaintiff full compensation for his
damages. 2 A court which ignores this possibility cannot be assured that
some persuasive extrovert on the jury will not say: "Sure, I know, all these
verdicts, you have to pay taxes, if we want this fellow to get $50,000, you
got to give him $100,000." Some more reflective introvert might say,
"I don't know, I am not sure, why not ask the judge for instruction ?"
This is, of course, possible, but it is equally probable that in the jury room
just as in life on the outside, reflective minds are frequently brushed aside,
and capitulate.
The point need not be belabored further. The conclusion is obvious.
Why have uncertainty when certainty can be so easily achieved ?22
2
°Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 1ll.2d 135, 150, 125 N.E.2d 77, 85 (1955); accord,
McWeeney v. N.Y., N.H. & H.R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 39 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870
(1960); Mitchell v. Emblade, 80 Ariz. 398, 405, 298 P.2d 1034, 1038 (1956); Gorham v.
Farmington Motor Inn, Inc., 159 Conn. 576, 581, 271 A.2d 94, 97 (1970); Atlantic C.LR.R.
v. Braz, 182 So.2d 491, 495 (Ct. App. Fla. 1966); Kawamoto v. Yasutake, 49 Hawaii 42, 51,
410 P.2d 976, 981 (1966); Guerra v. WJ. Young Constr. Co., 165 So.2d 882, 887 (Ct. App.
La.), cert. denied, 167 So.2d 676 (La. 1964); Briggs v. Chicago G.W. Ry., 248 Minn. 418,
431, 80 N.W.2d 625, 636 (1957); Bracy v. Great N.R.R., 136 Mont. 65, 75, 343 P.2d 848,
853 (1959); Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R. v. Kinsey, 372 P.2d 863, 866-67 (Okla. 1962); Missouri- I
K.-T.R.R. v. McFerrin, 279 S.W.2d 410, 419 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 1
156 Tex. 69, 291 S.W.2d 931 (1956); Crum v. Ward, 146 W. Va. 421, 443, 122 S.A2d 18,
30-31 (1961).
21 Comment, Personal Injury Awards and the Nonexistent Income Tax-Ilhat Is a Proper
Jury Charge?, 26 FORDHAM L. R3v. 98, 101-03 (1957).
2 Cunningham v. Rederiet Vindeggen A/S, 333 F.2d 308, 318 (2d Cir. 1964) (Moore,
J., dissenting) (an unusual dissent, since the issue of the cautionary instruction on income taxes
was not involved in the case); accord, Domeracki v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 443 F.2d 1245,
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That such colloquies occur frequently is apparent from the many reported cases in
which juries have asked judges whether the award would be taxable2 Since jury
deliberations are not reported, it is impossible to ascertain the number of verdicts
which have been inflated to offset nonexistent taxes.
Still another objection to the instruction which was approved in Domeracki is
that it might lead the jury to undercompensate the plaintiff. This objection is based
on the argument that a jury which knows or believes that the amounts introduced
into evidence representing the plaintiff's lost earnings have not been reduced by
income taxes, and which is instructed that the award computed from these pre-tax
amounts will itself not be taxed, might be unwilling to award the plaintiff more
than he would have actually received in after-tax income had he not been injured.
The jury might deduct from the properly computed award an amount which it esti-
mates the plaintiff would have paid in taxes had he earned the money represented
by the award. 4 This danger can be minimized with a well-drafted instruction such
as the one approved in Domeracki.2 5 The instruction should inform the jury that
if an award is made, it is not subject to income taxes. It should direct the jury
to measure the plaintiff's damages by the instructions already given, and to neither
add to nor subtract from the award on account of federal income taxes.
As Professor Nordstrom points out 28 the issue finally becomes a question of
what goes on in the jury room. To the extent that, having received the cautionary
instruction, the jury includes in its award an amount to cover nonexistent taxes, the
1251 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 883 (1971); Payne v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 309 F.2d
546, 551-52 (6th Cir. 1962) (O'Sullivan, J., dissenting); McWeeney v. N.Y., N.H. & HYLR,
282 F.2d 34, 40-41 (2d Cir. 1960) (Lumbard, C.J., dissenting); Anderson v. United Air lines,
Inc., 183 F. Supp. 97 (S.D. Cal. 1960); Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 346, 251 S.W.2d
42, 45 (1952); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAmEs, THE LAw OF TORTS § 25.12, at 1327-28 (1956);
Nordstrom, supra note 16, at 236; Peck & Hopkins, Economics and Impdred Earning Capacity
in Personal Injury Cases, 44 WASHL L. REV. 351, 369-70 (1969).
23 E.g., Laird v. Hudson Eng'r Corp., 449 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1971); Gault v. Poor Sisters,
375 F.2d 539 (6th Cir. 1967); Spencer v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 186 Kan. 345, 350 P.2d
18 (1960); Crecelius v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 144 Neb. 394, 13 N.W.2d 627 (1944); Osborne
v. Miller, 38 App. Div. 2d 298, 328 N.Y.S.2d 769 (1972); Towli v. Ford Motor Co., 30 App.
Div. 2d 319, 292 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1968). One writer reports that, "A judge of the Supreme Court
of Ohio... stated that during his tenure as a Common Pleas Judge, five Foremen asked this
specific question." Morris, Should Juries in Personal Injury Cases Be Instructed That PlaintiPs
Recoveries Are Not Income within the Meaning of Federal Tax Law?, 3 DEFENSE LJ. 3, 12
(1958).24 Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 Ill. 2d 135, 151, 125 N.E.2d 77, 85-86 (1955); Hard-
ware Mut. Cas. Co., v. Harry Crow & Son, Inc., 6 'Wis. 2d 396, 405-08, 94 N.W.2d 577, 581-
83 (1959); Crum v. Ward, 146 W. Va. 421, 443-44, 122 S.E.2d 18, 31 (1961). This
argument makes sense in "gross income" jurisdictions, those in which the award is computed
from evidence of the plaintiff's pretax earnings, but is not persuasive in "net income" jurisdic-
tions, since the jury is instructed to deduct an amount for income taxes from the plaintiffs lost
earnings and loss of future earning capacity in computing the award. Cf. Floyd v. Fruit Indus.,
Inc., 144 Conn. 659, 136 A.2d 918 (1957), in which the net income (minority) rule is estab-
lished in Connecticut.
In several cases, courts have wisely upheld trial courts' refusals to give purported cautionary
instructions so worded by the defendants that the juries could easily have interpreted them to
require, or at least allow, a net income award. E.g., Bowyer v. Te-Co, Inc., 310 S.W.2d 892
(Mo. 1958); Maus v. New York, C. & St L.LR., 165 Ohio St. 281, 135 N.E.2d 253 (1956);
Behringer v. State Farm Mut Auto. Ins. Co., 6 Wis. 2d 595, 95 N.W.2d 249 (1959).
2 5 See text accompanying note 4 supra. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 16; Nord-
strom, supra note 16, at 234-35.
26 Nordstrom, supra note 16.
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plaintiff is overcompensated. 27 On the other hand, to the extent that, having re-
ceived the instruction, the jury awards the plaintiff less than it would have had it
not heard the charge, he is undercompensated.2 8 In either case, the desideratum is
that the court charge the jury in the manner most likely to result in fair compen-
sation according to the rules of damages. The problem is that we do not know
what goes on in jury rooms; courts can only guess, instruct and hope, but
certainly the English language is both broad enough and precise enough to
form the basis of an instruction that makes it clear that the jury should not
add an amount to a verdict for the payment of nonexistent taxes and at the
same time that it should not subtract an amount because the award comes
to the plaintiff tax-free.29
A few courts have opposed the cautionary instruction on the ground that to
allow it would pave the way for other instructions which are dearly improper. This
argument grants that the cautionary instruction correctly states the law, but asks why,
if the defendant is entitled to this instruction, the plaintiff should not be entitled to
instructions which state the law just as correctly, such as that
the expense of trial is not provided for in the instruction concerning dam-
ages, that the cost of medical witnesses is not paid by the defendant, that
the expense of taking depositions, as well as court reporting at the tria,
must be borne by the individual litigants, that the fees of plaintiff's attor-
ney are not recognized as an element, that the defendant can deduct any
award it pays from its income and excess profits tax return and that the
... (defendant will not absorb the amount of the award, but will pass it
on in the form of increased prices].3°
The answer to this objection is that a plaintiff requests such instructions in the hope
of receiving an increase in the award to which he is not entitled, while the defen-
dant's purpose in requesting a properly phrased cautionary instruction on taxes is
to prevent the plaintiff from receiving an added amount to which he is not en-
titled.31 The likely effects on the jury of the two types of instructions are similarly
distinguishable.
27 "[This] would be improper regardless of whether the jurisdiction follows the gross or net
rule with regard to earnings, and regardless of which elements of damages comprise the award."
Feldman, Personal Injury Awards: Should Tax-Exempt Status Be Ignored?, 7 ARIZ. L REV, 272,
279 (1966).
28 "Is it worse that a jury, in disregard of instructions and presumptions, will reduce an
award which in natural justice should have been reduced by taxes that would have been owed,
or that the jury will compound an injustice, already present because gross earnings for damage
purposes take no account of taxes, by adding still another windfall in the erroneous belief that
no exemption exists for injury awards?" Burns, A Compensation Award for Perional Injutry
or Wrongful Death Is Tax-Exempt: Should We Tell the jury?, 14 DEPAUL L REm. 320, 331
(1965). This argument is directed to the equity of the gross income rule as a method of mea-
suring damages, and ignores the fact that, for purposes of this article, any departure from the
measure of damages deemed proper in a given jurisdiction is undesirable.
29 Nordstrom, supra note 16, at 235.
30 Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 II. 2d 135, 151, 125 N.E.2d 77, 86 (1955).
31 "A more telling analogy may be made to the exclusionary rule concerning insurance.
Defendant's counsel is not permitted to inform the jury that the defendant is uninsured despite
the possibility that the jury might otherwise assume insurance and find liability or increased
damages because of its notions of desirable risk distribution." Comment, Propriety of Conanent
on non-Taxability of Personal Injury Verdict, 21 U. CuI. L. REV. 156, 158 (1953). Although
this point is well taken, a discussion of the merits of the exclusionary rule concerning insurance
is beyond the scope of this article. Even if the rule is well-founded, that does not necessarily
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Finally, refusal to give the instruction cannot be justified on the ground that,
since personal injury awards do not, as a rule, overcompensate plaintiffs, it would
be counterproductive to vary the mechanism which produces these awards. This
argument (which for obvious reasons courts do not articulate) fails because "it
assumes the correctness of the end product and then proves the end product by the
assumption."3 2  If personal injury awards are generally fair, then for reasons
previously discussed, the tendency of the absence of the cautionary instruction to
inflate awards above the level of fair compensation is being counterbalanced by
some defect or defects in other elements of the equation. While it may or may not
be that these two defects cancel each other in the totality of cases, there is no way
of knowing whether they do so in a particular case.33
In conclusion, for whatever reason or reasons, courts in the past have generally
viewed the cautionary instruction on the nontaxability of the award with disfavor.
It is significant that the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Domeracki has
held, without precedent in the federal courts, that the trial courts in that circuit must
give this instruction when so requested. The decision deserves careful study by the
courts which will consider this issue in the future.
Harry Af. Cochran, Jr.
LABOR LAW-RIGHT TO STRIKE IN THE ABSENCE OF A No-STRnE CLAUSE
OR GRIEVANCE-ARBITRATION PRovlsIoN-Iodice v. Calabrese, 345 F. Supp. 248
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
I. INTRODUCTION
Although the right to strike has never been accorded unqualified constitutional
protection,' the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),2 as amended, recognizes
strike activity as a lawful economic weapon in labor disputes. Indeed, one of the
central purposes of the NLRA is to facilitate the use of strikes and other forms of
economic pressure by employees to achieve parity of bargaining power between man-
agement and labor.3 Because the NLRA provides the primary statutory regulation
of the right to strike, it is the logical starting point in determining whether strike
activity is protected.
In lodice v. Calabres$ a district court disregarded the NLRA in determining that
the defendant union breached its collective bargaining agreement with its employer.
Moreover, apparently straining to find a compensable ground, the court constructed
a new theory of labor agreement law: even in the absence of a no-strike clause or
militate against the propriety of the cautionary instruction concerning the taxability of the award,
since different considerations are involved.
2 Nordstrom, supra note 16, at 236.
3 3 
"It is unsafe to assume that this other element which needs to be re-defined-whatever
it may be-is balanced by the present status of what twelve people erroneously believe-and
this could vary from case to case-about the impact of income taxes on the award they make."
Id. at 237.
1THE DEVLOPING LABOR LAW 518 (C. Morris ed. 1971).
229 U.S.C § 151 et. seq. (1970).
3 Cox, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 INm. LJ. 319, 322 (1951); see
HR. REP. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
4 345 F. Supp. 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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grievance-arbitration provision, a strike breaches a collective bargaining agreement
if it is not justified by a prior material breach by the employer.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1950 former Teamster member Anthony Iodice witnessed an assault by Peter
Calabrese, a business agent for Teamsters Local 456. He later testified against
Calabrese, who was convicted of criminal assault and subsequently served nearly
nine months of a one-year sentence. Apparently in retaliation for his testimony
against Calabrese, lodice suffered continuing business interruptions resulting from
harassment by Calabrese and the union.
In 1965 lodice purchased Pelham Transportation Company, Inc. (Pelham) for
Bart Ruggiero. Thereafter, Ruggiero owned Pelham, and lodice served in a minor
advisory capacity. Pelham signed a contract with Local 456. The Teamsters began
a strike against Pelham on November 5, 1965. The strike lasted approximately
two years and forced Pelham out of business. Pelham had failed over the months
to make fringe benefit payments, a clear breach of the union contract. Even though
Ruggiero tendered payment in an attempt to extinguish the debt and thereby resolve
the dispute, Calabrese refused to accept the offer, claiming that back pay was due
one of the union members who had not worked during the strike. As a conse-
quence of this labor dispute, plaintiffs Iodice, Pelham and others brought this action
against defendant Calabrese. This article will focus upon Pelham's claim under
§ 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) 5 that Local 456 breached
the collective bargaining agreement by continuing the strike beyond the date on
which payment was tendered.
Ill. STATUTORY PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO STRIKI
The substantive law to be applied in suits under § 301 of the LMRA is federal
law, which the courts are to construe in light of national labor policies.0 Con.
sequently, the NLRA, which expresses the national labor policy, is the starting
point in determining whether the strike by Local 456 was a breach of the collective
bargaining agreement.
Section 7 of the NLRA grants "[e]mployees ... the right ... to engage in
• . concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection ..- 7 Before a right to strike exists, three conditions must be
met. First, only employees qualify for § 7 rights; hence, the definition of "em-
ployee" largely determines the scope of § 7 rights under the NLRA. An "em.
ployee" includes "any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or
in connection with, any current labor dispate .. .and who has not obtained any
other regular and substantially equivalent employment . . . ."8 Consequently, the
"employee" requirement is satisfied if there is a labor dispute between employees
and their employer which precipitated the employees' activity. The NLRA broadly
defines "labor dispute" as "any controversy concerning terms, tenure or conditions
of employment .. ..,, Because Pelham failed to pay the required fringe benefits
on time, the resulting strike involved a "controversy concerning terms ...of em-
a29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
6 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
729 U.S.C. § 157 (1970) (emphasis supplied).
8Id. § 152(3) (1970) (emphasis supplied).
9 Id. § 152(9) (1970).
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ployment," and thus the strike activity in the principal case qualifies as a labor dis.
pute. Therefore, the strike satisfies the "employee" requirement.
The second requirement of § 7 which must be met in order for an activity to
be protected is that it must be a concerted activity. The NLRA does not define
"concerted activity," but the courts have construed nonviolent strikes to be con-
certed activities under the Act. For example, in National Packing Co. v, NLRB,1o
in which employees walked out in protest against the failure of their employer to
come forward with an allegedly promised pay raise, the strike was deemed to be a
form of concerted activity under the NLRA. Since Local 456's strike was a non-
violent strike, as was the strike in National Packing, it satisfies the "concerted ac-
tivity" test.
The third and last of the § 7 requirements is that the purpose of the employees'
concerted activity must be "collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protec-
tion."" Beyond this broadly stated requirement, the NLRA does not provide a
test for determining whether Local 456's strike was for a protected objective. How-
ever, case law indicates that a strike in protest of a contract breach is protected.
For example, in San Juan Lumber Co.,12 despite a no-strike clause, employees were
held to have the right to strike when an employer breached his basic obligation to
pay wages on time.' 3 The court noted in Iodice that fringe benefits are a form of
compensation equal in importance to monetary wages, and that Pelham did ma-
terially breach its contractual obligation. 14 Applying the San Juan rationale, the
strike following Pelham's failure to pay fringe benefits meets the "purpose" require-
ment under the Act.
Because all the requirements of the NLRA are satisfied, Local 456's strike was
one by "[e]mployees ...engage[d] in . ..concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection .... ."u and therefore was
entitled to protection under § 7.
The Iodice court, however, reached a different conclusion. In determining that
Calabrese and his union breached the collective bargaining agreement, notwith-
standing the material breach by Pelham, the court, without citing authority, con-
cluded that the strike was a breach of contract because it
became a pretext for the purpose of punishing Pelham; for the purpose
of exacting from it a substantially larger sum of money than it rightfully
owed; [and] for the purpose of demonstrating the power of his union
over those with whom it did business.16
The court apparently disregarded the NLRA and prior case law in coming to its
decision. As discussed above, a strike in protest of a breach of contract is a pro-
tected labor activity under the NIRA. In 1956 it was held that under the NLRA,
as amended, courts are required to protect the right to strike except as specifically
provided in the Act.' 7 Congress specifically enumerated the activities not entitled
to protection. Section 8(b) of the Act proscribes secondary boycotts, strikes to com-
pel an employer to commit unfair labor practices, and jurisdictional strikes over
10 352 F.2d 482 (10th Cir. 1965).
"129 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
12154 N.L.R.B. 1153, enf'd, 365 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1966).
13 Id.
14 345 F. Supp. at 265.
1529 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
16 345 F. Supp. at 266-67.
17Douds v. Teamsters Local 976, 139 F. Supp. 702, 711 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
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work assignments.' 8 Nowhere in the Act is there a proscription of the type of
activity pursued by Local 456. Furthermore, § 13 of the Act provides a test for
the construction of § 7 rights:
Nothing in this subchapter, except as specifically provided for herein,
shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in
any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on
that right.' 9
It follows that since Congress did not specifically proscribe protests against a breach
of contract, Local 456's strike should have been protected by § 7 of the NLRA.
IV. WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO STrIrKE
Of more far-reaching significance than the court's holding is the basic assump-
tion it made that even in the absence of a no-strike clause or grievance-arbitration
provision, a strike may be a breach of contract. Without citing authority for this
proposition, the court stated:
Stripped of all but the essentials, a collective bargaining agreement repre-
sents a purchase by an employer of labor for his business, and the basic
promise made by the union in every such agreement is that it will provide
the employer with men to work. Any action by the union in derogation
of this promise can only be justified by a breach by the employer of a
significant obligation on his part.20
The court reasoned that by agreeing to work, employees impliedly waive the right
to strike. This proposition does not withstand analysis. The right to strike may
be waived by an express agreement not to strike,21 and a no.strike provision will be
implied as a quid pro quo to the extent that there is an operable agreement to arbi.
trate disputes arising under the contract.2 2 However, in this case Local 456 did
not expressly waive the right to strike, nor did it impliedly waive the right by agree.
ing to an arbitration provision2
In NLRB v. Lion Oil Co.,24 a case in which there was no express waiver of the
right to strike, the Supreme Court held that a waiver of the right should never be as-
sumed. In the Lion Oil case, the employees had refused to agree to the company's
demand for a no-strike clause. Subsequently, when a strike occurred as the parties
were bargaining over contract modifications, the court held that it was not within
the contemplation of the parties that economic weapons not be used.2 5
The significance accorded the right to strike is further exemplified in Alastro
Plastics Corp. v. NLRB.20 There the Supreme Court held that notwithstanding a
no-strike clause, it was not the intention of the employees to waive the right to
strike in response to an unfair labor practice. The Court stated:
In the absence of some contractual or statutory provision to the contrary,
1829 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1970).
19 Id. § 163 (1970).
20 345 F. Supp. at 265.
2 1 Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
2 2 Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
2 345 F. Supp. at 265.
24352 U.S. 282, 293 (1957).
25d. at 293-94.
26 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
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petitioners' unfair labor practices provide adequate ground for the orderly
strike that occurred here.. . .[W]e assume that the employees, by ex-
plicit contractual provision, could have waived their right to strike .... 2I
Lion Oil and ilastro Plastics suggest that the right to strike under § 7 is not to
be treated cavalierly. The Iodice court's assertion that every collective bargaining
agreement implies the promise not to strike is a dangerous doctrine lacking sup-
port in statutory or case law.
Moreover, the Iodice rationale is inconsistent with the basic contract law principle
that the justifiable expectations of the parties are to be considered in interpreting
an agreement 28 The basic promise that a union can give is the promise not to
strike. The court's analysis breaks down when it asserts that every such agreement
includes this promise. It is common practice, for example, in the construction in-
dustry for an agreement merely to grant recognition to a union, establish a dosed
or union shop, and fix the wage scale and hours of work without waiving the right
to strike.29 Clearly, if a union wishes to give up the right to strike, it can do so
by contract. However, for a court to alter the agreement of the parties as suggested
by the lodice decision is an unwarranted extension of judicial power.
V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Underlying the court's decision in Iodice seems to be a suspicion that the strike
was only nominally concerned with fringe benefits, and was really a continuation of
the harassment employed by the union over the years to avenge Calabrese's criminal
conviction.30 If this suspicion is correct and the court desired to punish the union
for its deplorable conduct, a breach of contract suit under § 301 of the LMRA was
not the proper device to punish the wrong.
When the other alleged causes of action failed to provide an adequate remedy,
the court was faced with permitting the union's previous harassment to go without
redress. Although failure to provide a remedy is an argument for exercising § 301
jurisdiction, the court had to strain to find a compensable ground under § 301, and
did so at the considerable expense of the right to strike under § 7 of the NLRA.
If, as the court asserts, the strike was intended to exact money not rightfully owed,
such activity should be treated as extortion or a similar crime;3' criminal justice
ought not be done at the expense of the collective bargaining process.
Iodice involves a major departure in federal labor poliy-assuming a no-strike
clause is within every collective bargaining agreement-that should be made by
Congress and interpreted by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). As
stated in Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney,3 2 the purpose of § 301 is to "assur[e)
the enforceability of such (collective bargaining] agreements."33  However, in
Iodice enforcement of the agreement is ficticious. The court merely phrased the
issues in breach of contract terms in order to provide a remedy. By finding that
Calabrese's concern with fringe benefits was only nominal, the court reached § 7
27rid. at 278-79 (emphasis supplied). Limitations on fastro Plastics are discussed in Com-
ment, Statutory and Contractual Restrictions on the Right to Strike During the Term of a Collec.
tive Bargaining Agreement, 70 YALE L.J. 1366, 1382 (1961).
281 A. CORBiN, CONTRACTS 1-3 (1950).
2 9 Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARV. L REv. 601, 605 (1955).
30 See text accompanying note 16 supra.
3 1 See Hobbs And-Racketeering Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1970).
a2 368 U.S. 502 (1963).
3Id. at 509.
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issues rather than contract issues. Furthermore, its interpretation of § 7 disturbed
a defined federal labor policy that § 7 rights are not to be impaired except as
specifically provided in the NLRA.
Congress confided primary interpretation and application of the NLRA to the
NLRB because of the need for uniformity in administration of the Act.34 Al-
though § 301 represents a statutory exception to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
NLRB in interpreting the NLRA, Iodice represents a special case in which the court
should decline to exercise § 301 jurisdiction because the need for uniformity of
interpretation of § 7 rights is more compelling than the need for judicial enforce-
ment of agreements. Indeed, Iodice conflicts with the most important of our na-
tional labor laws, the NLRA, and the most significant of labor's economic weapons,
the right to strike. This decision strains the collective bargaining process. Col-
lective bargaining cannot withstand such tension, even though a court may desire to
reach an equitable result.
VI. CONCLUSION
Under § 7 of the NLRA and decisions construing § 7 rights, a strike protesting
a breach of contract is a protected activity. The lodice court disregarded the NLRA
in order to find Calabrese and his union in breach of contract, notwithstanding a
prior breach by Pelham. Furthermore, the court made the far-reaching and danger-
ous assertion that a no-strike clause is to be assumed in every collective bargaining
agreement.
Even if the court was correct in finding that the strike was really for vengeance
rather than a protest of a contract breach, revision of the right-to-strike laws should
be made by Congress and the NLRB, not by the courts. Reprehensible conduct
should not go unredressed, but § 301 of the LMRA is not the proper source of
remedy under these circumstances. For these reasons, lodice v. Calabrese should
not be followed.
James C. 1Warner
CRIMINAL LAW-THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT A PRE-INDICTMENT CONFRON-
TATION-Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
Thomas Kirby and Ralph Bean were convicted of robbery based on a pre-indict-
ment showup identification made at a police station while the two men were without
benefit of counsel. On the day of their arrest, Kirby and Bean, while walking down
Madison Street in Chicago, were stopped by two policemen and asked for identifica-
tion. One of the policemen testified at trial that the men were stopped because Kirby
resembled a wanted man whose picture was on a bulletin in the police car.' When
Kirby opened his wallet, the policeman noted traveler's checks in the wallet made out
to a "Willie Shard." When Kirby failed to produce a satisfactory explanation of
his possession of such checks, Kirby and Bean were arrested and taken to police head-
quarters to be questioned. The policemen then learned that a man named Willie
Shard had been robbed two days before. The police sent for Shard and when he
entered the room where Kirby and Bean were being held, he identified them as the
two men who had robbed him.2 Besides the two suspects, only the policemen and
34 Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
1 Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 684 n.1 (1972).
2 Id. at 684-85.
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Shard were in the room at the time. At no time was either man advised of any right
to counsel.3 Kirby and Bean were subsequently tried and convicted of robbery after
a pretrial motion to suppress Shard's identification had been denied. Kirby's con-
viction was upheld on appeal4 while Bean's conviction was reversed.5 Certiorari was
granted by the Supreme Court on the question of whether or not there is a right to
counsel at pre-indictment confrontations. 6 In United States v. WradeT and Gilbert v.
California,s the Court had already decided that the right to counsel existed in post-
indictment lineups and had established a per se exclusionary rule for identifications
obtained when the suspect's lawyer was not present. Under this rule, eyewitness
identifications at trial are not permitted if based upon any earlier lineup identification
unless the accused had either been represented by counsel at the lineup or had knowl-
edgeably waived his right to be represented.9 In a five to four decision,10 the Su-
preme Court refused to extend W ade to pre-indictment cases, holding that the sixth
amendment"z attaches only after the initiation of formal criminal proceedings by way
of formal charge, arraignment, preliminary hearing, information or indictment.'-
It was not easy to thus limit sixth amendment rights to a point after indictment
in light of the policy considerations the Court had enuciated earlier in United States
v. Wade. In that case, the Court held that a defendant should have the right to counsel
at any "critical period" in the prosecution and defined that period as "any stage of the
prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel's absence might der-
ogate the accused's right to a fair trial."13 The Court went on to hold, in an opinion
by Justice Brennan, that a post-indictment lineup was such a critical stage because
of the dangers of mistaken identity,' 4 of improper suggestion by the police,'! and of
31d. at 685.
4 People v. Kirby, 121 IlL App. 2d 323,257 N.E.2d 589 (1970).
5 People v .Bean, 121 IlL App. 2d 332,257 N.E.2d 562 (1970).
6 Certiorari was limited to the right to counsel question. "The practice of showing suspects
singly to persons for the purpose of identification, and not as part of a lineup, has been widely
condemned." Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967). The question of the constitution-
ality of the showup procedure itself was not argued in Kirby, however. "In view of our limited
grant of certiorari, we do not consider whether there might have been a deprivation of due
process in the particularized circumstances of this case." Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 691
n.8 (1972).
7388 U.S. 218 (1967).
8388 U.S. 263 (1967).
9 388 U.S. 218, 240 (1967).
o Justices Blackman, Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger joined in Justice Stewart's opinion
which announced the judgment of the Court. Justice Powell concurred in the result. Justice
Brennan wrote a dissent joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall, while Justice White concurred
separately.
1 Fifth amendment rights against incrimination were not at issue here. The fifth amend-
ment only concerns protecting a person from giving testimonial evidence against himself.
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). In IVade, it was held that forcing a person to ex-
hibit himself in a lineup is similar to forcing a suspect to submit to a blood test in that neither
was testimonial evidence and, therefore, neither is protected by the fifth amendment. 388 US.
at 221.
'2 In a recent post-Kirby decision, the Missouri supreme court held that adversary judicial
proceedings begin, and the right to counsel attaches, when a complaint is filed or a warrant is
issued. Arnold v. State, 484 S.W.2d 248 (Mo. 1972).
13 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967).
14 d. at 228. See also E. BORcHARD, CONVicriNG THE INNOcExT (1932); P. WALL,
EYEWrrNESS IDENMTICAnON IN CRI INAL CASES (1965).
15 388 U.S. 218.
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lack of awareness by both witnesses and participants at lineups of any prejudicial
occurrences.' 6 Furthermore, Justice Brennan warned that once a person has made
an identification at a lineup, he was not likely to go back on his word later and any
protest as to the fairness of the lineup was "likely to be made in vain; the jury's choice
is between the accused's unsupported version and that of the police officers present." 17
Finally, Justice Brennan suggested that although cross-examination was available to
show what went on at a lineup or showup, "the first line of defense must be the pre.
vention of unfairness and the lessening of the hazards of eyewitness identification
at the lineup itself."' 8
In addition to the policy considerations proclaimed by the Court in Irade, some
of the language used by the Court to describe the scope of the sixth amendment makes
it exceedingly difficult to see how that amendment can be limited to post-indictment
situations:
When the Bill of Rights was adopted, there were no organized police forces
as we know them today. The accused confronted the prosecutor and the
witnesses against him, and the evidence was marshalled, largely at the trial
itself. In contrast, today's law enforcement machinery involves critical con-
frontations of the accused by the prosecution at pretrial proceedings where
the results might well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a
mere formality. In recognition of these realities of modern criminal prose-
cution, our cases have construed the Sixth Amendment guarantee to apply
to "critical" stages of the proceedings. The guarantee reads: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right .,. to have the assistance of
counsel for his defence." The plain meaning of this guarantee thus encom-
passes counsel's assistance whenever necessary to assure a meaningful "de-
fence."' 9
Justice White, in his dissenting opinion in Wade, simply assumed that the decision
was applicable to pre-indictment situations 0 Justice White's dissent was joined by
Justices Stewart and Harlan. In writing the plurality opinion in Kirby, Justice Stew-
art evidently changed his mind, though Justice White remained consistent and urged
that Wade and Gilbert were controlling in the pre-indictment situation.21 In fact,
the five members of the Court who had heard argument in both United States v. Wade
and Kirby v. Illinois voted four to one in Kirby that Wade was applicable to pre-
indictment lineups.
In some ways, the situation in Kirby shows an even more compelling need for
safeguards than the situation in Wade. In Wade, the susp.ect was put into a lineup
with a number of other persons, and the witnesses were asked to pick out a single indi-
vidual. In Kirby, the two suspects were shown by themselves and the victim was
asked whether the suspects were the ones who had robbed him. A situation like this
is certainly more laden with suggestion than a lineup, for in such a showup 22 the
11d. at 230.
'7 Id. at 231.
18d. at 235.
1 Id. at 224-25 (Emphasis by the Court).
20 Id. at 255.
21 Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 705 (1972) (White, J., dissenting).
22 In a showup the suspect is sown by himself to a witness and the witness is asked of the
suspect is the person who committed the crime. In a lineup the witness is asked to pick out
the suspect from a number of people in the lineup.
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witness is given the impression that the police believe this particular suspect is guilty.as
Moreover, when two men are exhibited together in a showup, as they were in Kirby,
possibilities for misidentification are even greater than in a showup with just one sus-
pect. Assuming that just one of the two men is actually guilty of the crime in ques-
tion, if a witness can identify the guilty suspect, there is an extremely strong sugges-
tion made to the witness that the second man must be guilty also.
Justice Stewart's Kirby opinion also failed to adequately distinguish Miranda v.
Arizona24 and Escobedo v. Illinois.25 Miranda involved a pre-indictment situation
in which the accused was arrested at his home, taken into custody, and brought to the
police station. The evidence, including a confession, obtained at his interrogation
without benefit of counsel, was declared inadmissible because it was gathered in
violation of his constitutional rights. Miranda, Justice Stewart claimed, has no ap-
plicability to a pre-indictment confrontation since it was limited to protection of
fifth amendment rights against self-incrimination, an area not in dispute in Kirby.2 6
In Miranda the purpose of having an attorney was to vindicate and insure that fifth
amendment rights were protected.27 In Wade the purpose of having an attorney
was to insure that sixth amendment rights were protected. If a suspect does not
have a right to counsel at a post-indictment lineup, his right to counsel at trial is
meaningless, for the matter of his guilt will have been decided at a stage where he
could have no attorney and when the most incriminating evidence was gathered.2-
Miranda was indeed a right to counsel case, and the purpose of that right, as in
Wade, was to protect a right originally applicable only at trial,22 but which, in
light of extensive, early police investigation, needed to be applicable earlier. If a
lineup is a "critical stage" in the prosecution of a suspect, to cut off the right to
counsel simply because a formal adversary stance has not been taken contradicts
Mirandds assurance that the right to counsel is protected whenever a right guaran-
teed at the trial stage would be cut off by lack of counsel at an earlier time, even
if that time is before a formal indictment.
The opinion of the Court in Kirby also attempts to distinguish Escobedo by
calling it a fifth amendment case.30 However, since Escobedo was dearly framed
in sixth amendment terms,3 ' the majority in Kirby was undoubtedly wrong on this
23p. WALT, note 14 supra; Kirby v. Illinois 406 U.S. 682, 699-700 (1972) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
24 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
25 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
2 6Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 687 (1972).
2
"T he right to have counsel present at the interrogation is indispensable to the protection
of the Fifth Amendment privilege under the system we delineate today." Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 469 (1965).
28 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967).
29 "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self..." U.S. CONST. amend V.
3 0 
"[T]he Court in retrospect perceived that the 'prime purpose' of Escobcdo was not to vin-
dicate the constitutional right to counsel as such, bur, like Miranda, 'to guarantee full effectuaion
of the privilege against self-incrimination .... ' Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972).
31 The critical question in this case is whether, under the circumstances, the refusal
by the police to honor petitioner's request to consult with his lawyer during the course
of an interrogation constitutes a denial of "the Assistance of Counsel" in violation of
the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution as "made obligatory upon the States by the
Fourteenth Amendment" ....
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 479 (1964).
1972]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
point. The Court seems to argue in the alternative that even if Escobedo was a
right to counsel case, it was limited to its own particular facts by Johnson v. Nell
Jersey.32  Johnson, however, held only that the Escobedo and Miranda decisions
were not retroactive and were applicable only to cases in which the trial began
after those decisions had been announced. Since Johnson and Miranda were being
considered by the Court at the same time,33 it is difficult to support a conclusion
that in Miranda the Court expanded the right to counsel" 4 and in Johnson it con-
stricted that right, particularly since Johnson purported to deal only with the retro.
activity of the Escobedo and Miranda decisions and not the right to counsel itself.
The language in Johnson relied on by the Kirby majority is subject to more than
one interpretation,3 5 but since Johnson was decided so soon after Miranda, that
language should be construed in light of the expansion of the right to counsel
that Miranda announced. Finally, whatever limiting effect Johnson might have
had on the substantive interpretation of Escobedo and Miranda was erased by the
fact that Wade, which was decided a year after Johnson, relied heavily on Escobedo
and Miranda as right to counsel cases.36
The Court in Kirby, as a final attempt to limit Wade, stated the tenuous propo-
sition that a sentence in Simmons v. United States37 further explained that 1lrade
was limited to post-indictment lineups.3 8 Simmons, however, was not a right to
counsel case, but rather a due process case which held that the use of photographs
at pretrial identifications did not violate a suspect's fourteenth amendment rights.
Furthermore, the only mention of Wade in the Simmons opinion was a short state-
ment that Wade was not applicable on the facts.39
As prior Supreme Court pronouncements on the right to counsel did not indi-
cate that it should be limited to a post-indictment stage, lower court interpretations
of Wade made before Kirby also generally concluded that there is a right to coun-
32 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
W Miranda was decided on June 13, 1966. Johnson was decid-d on June 20, 1966.
S4 Escobedo held only that a suspect being interrogated by the police could not be denied
his right to counsel if he requested to speak with an attorney. Miranda went further and held
that a suspect had a right to counsel at a police interrogation whether he requested one or not
and that this right could only be given up by a knowledgeable waiver.
5 Apart from its broad implications, the precise holding of Escobedo was that
statements elicited by the police during an interrogation may not be used against the
accused at a criminal trial, "[where] the investigation is no longer a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has
been taken into police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogation that
lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and been
denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police have not effec-
tively warned him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent ..
Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 733-34 (1966) (Emphasis supplied).
36 Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 692-95 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
37390 U.S. 377 (1968).
28"The rationale of those [Wade and Gilbert] cases was that an accused is entitled to
counsel at any 'critical stage of the prosecution,' and that a post-indictment lineup
is such a 'critical stage.'"
Id. at 382-83.
39 Simmons, however, does not contend that he was entitled to counsel at the time the
pictures were shown to the witnesses. Rather, he asserts simply that in the circun-
stances the identification procedure was so unduly prejudicial as fatally to taint his
conviction. This is a claim which must be evaluated in light of the totality of sur-




sel at pre-indictment lineups. Many state courts40 and all the federal courts of
appeals4x which had considered the issue had come to this conclusion about the
meaning of Wade. In one of the best reasoned of the state court decisions, the Cali.
fornia Supreme Court, after listing a number of reasons why Wade was applicable
to pre-indictment situations, concluded with this rather cogent observation:
[W]e think it dear that the establishment of the date of formal accusa-
tion as the time wherein the right to counsel at lineup attaches could only
lead to a situation wherein substantially all lineups would be conducted
prior to indictment or information. We cannot reasonably suppose that
the high court, recognizing the same dangers of abuse and misidentifica-
tion exist in all lineups, would announce a rule so susceptible of emascula-
tion by avoidance.42
None of the state courts43 which had restricted Wfade to a post-indictment situ-
ation did so on the constitutional ground that the right to counsel did not extend
to a pre-indictment situation. They simply found that the narrow holding of 117ade
did not require a right to counsel at pre-indictment lineups and they were unwilling
to extend the Supreme Court's holding.
A few of the state courts which held that the right to counsel attached during
the pre-indictment period did so by distinguishing the investigatory stage from the
accusatory stage.44 The Supreme Court did not recognize this distinction in Kirby,
holding essentially that any pre-indictment stage is investigatory and not accusatory.
On this point, an Ohio appellate court conduded as follows:
Although some courts have restricted the Wade and Gilbert rules to
post-indictment confrontations ... the better view, the one most respon-
sive to the reasoning in the Wade and Gilbert cases.., is that the Wvade
and Gilbert rules extend to any lineup conducted where the prosecutive
process has shifted from the investigatory stage to the accusatory stage and
focuses on the accused, except in emergency situations. . . . The rules
would thus apply to most lineups because a suspect is not ordinarily
placed in a lineup until, as here, the investigatory process has disclosed
his probable implication in the crime.45
40 See People v. Fowler, 1 Cal. 3d 335, 461 P.2d 643, 82 Cal. Rptr 363 (1969); State v.
Singleton, 253 La. 18, 215 So. 2d 838 (1968); Commonwealth v. Guillory, 356 Mass. 591, 254
N.E.2d 427 (1970); Palmer v. State, 5 Md. App. 691, 294 A.2d 482 (1969); People v. Hut-
ton, 21 Mich. App. 312, 175 N.W.2d 860 (1970); Thompson v. State, 85 Nev. 134, 451 P.2d
704 (1969); State v. Wright, 274 N.C. 84, 161 S.E.2d 581 (1968); State v. Isaacs, 24 Ohio
App. 2d 115, 265 N.E.2d 327 (1970); Commonwealth v. Whiting, 439 Pa. 205, 266 A.2d
738 (1970); In re Holley, 268 ..2d 723 (ILL 1970); Martinez v. State, 437 S.W.2d 842
(Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1969); State v. Hicks, 76 Wash. 2d 80, 455 P.2d 943 (1969); Hayes v.
State, 46 Wis. 2d 93, 175 N.W.2d 625 (1970).
41Wilson v. Gaffney, 454 F.2d 142 (10th Cir. 1972); Government of the Virgin Islands
v. Callwood, 440 F.2d 1206 (3rd Cir. 1971); Cooper v. Picard, 428 F.2d 1351 (lst Cir. 1970);
United States v. Ayers, 426 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Phillips, 427 F.2d 1035
(9th Cir. 1970); Mason v. United States, 414 F.2d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States v.
Broadhead, 413 F.2d 1351 (7th Cit. 1969); Rivers v. United States, 400 F.2d 935 (5th CIr.
1968).
4 2 People v. Fowler, 1 Cal. 3d 335, 344, 461 P.2d 643, 650, 82 Cal. Rptr. 363 370 (1969).
43 State v. Fields, 104 Ariz. 486, 455 P.2d 964 (1969); Perkins v. State, 228 So.2d 382
(Fla. 1969); People v. Palmer, 41 Ill. 2d 571, 244 N.F-2d 173 (1969); State v. Walters, 457
S.W.2d 817 (Mo. 1970); Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 664, 173 S.E.2d 792 (1970).
4See e.g., State v. Isaacs, 24 Ohio App. 2d 115, 265 N.F.2d 327 (1970); Hayes v. State,
46 Wis. 2d 93, 175 N.W.2d 625 (1970).
4 5 State v. Isaacs, 24 Ohio App. 2d 115, 117, 265 N.E.2d 327, 328-29 (1968).
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Under this view, Kirby would have been entitled to counsel. When Kirby and
Bean were discovered with traveler's checks and false identification, the investi-
gatory process began. After it was discovered that similar items had been taken
in a robbery two days before, the investigatory stage ended and the accusatory stage
began. When Shard was asked to come to the police station in order to try to
identify Kirby and Bean, the police were no longer conducting a general investiga-
tion, but had focused their accusations on these men.
If there was little precedent for the decisions in Kirby either at the Supreme
Court, lower federal court, or state court level, there are, nevertheless, policy argu-
ments with some merit for denying a right to counsel at pre.indictment lineups,
though Justice Stewart's opinion failed to mention them. These considerations
must have had some bearing on the Court's decision in light of the meager and
dubious precedent the majority opinion relied upon.
These policy arguments essentially fall into two categories. First, the right to
counsel does not attach in the case of photographic evidence40 or on-the-scene iden-
tifications, 47 and a skeptic might ask what the practical difference is between an
identification made at the scene of a crime or from a collection of photographs and
a similar identification made at a lineup or showup at the police station two hours
later. Essentially, the answer is that the difficulty of obtaining a lawyer for im-
mediate on-the-scene identifications or upon the examination of photographs at the
time a suspect is not in custody does not negate reasons for having a lawyer at
lineups when the difficulty of obtaining counsel is much less. It is simply a bal-
ancing test and the difficulty of obtaining a lawyer at the later stages does not out-
weigh the advantages while the reverse is true at earlier stages. The weakness of
this answer lies in the balancing test itself since one can just as easily reach the
opposite conclusion. Simply because it may be easier to obtain an attorney at a
lineup than at these other stages does not necessarily mean it is worth the effort,
time or expense.
The claim that whatever dangers there are at lineups are not adequately elimi-
nated by a lawyer's presence is the second major objection to the right to counsel
attaching at that stage. The attorney present at a lineup is merely authorized to per.
form the passive role of witness and observer.48 The lawyer can only hope that his
presence will inhibit the police'from making lineup conditions suggestive, for the po-
lice do not have to follow any of his recommendations. If the police lineup procedures
are not so prejudicial as to violate due process, they can use whatever procedures
they choose. If the police wish to coach witnesses in private, a lawyer's presence
at a lineup cannot stop them. Furthermore, lawyers are not schooled as psycholo-
gists and are not necessarily aware of subtle influences that may be important in
leading to misidentifications.4 These objections to the right to counsel at the line-
up stage assume bad faith among policemen. There can be no doubt that in some
cities lawyers and policemen are adversaries, but Wade has had the result in other
cities of encouraging cooperation between the police and attorneys in order to make
lineup procedure fairer.50 Not all of the dangers inherent in lineups are so subtle
40 Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
47 Russell v. United States, 408 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Commonwealth v. Bumpus,
328 N.E.2d 343 (Mass. 1968). But see Rivers v. United States, 400 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1968)
holding that on-the-scene identifications held long after the crime require counsel.
4SUnited States v. Gholston, 437 F.2d 260, 263 (6th Cir. 1971).
4 9 Read, Lawyers at Lineups, 17 U.C.L.A. L REv. 339, 362-67 (1969).




as to need psychologists to observe them. Some improper influences on witnesses
will be noticed by lawyers which the police, involved in the routine of the proce-
dure, will not readily observe, but which they may be willing to change. If the
police are inclined to disregard the lawyer's recommendations and proceed with a
lineup fraught with suggestibility, then the attorney, preferably after disassociating
himself from the case as counsel, can testify as to the lineup conditions. Juries
are more likely to believe the testimony of a reputable attorney than that of a crimi-
nal defendant.51  Moreover, a defendant may be reticent to testify at all if he has
any prior criminal convictions which can be used to impeach him during cross-
examination.
As a further disadvantage, some police officials claim that having an attorney
at the lineup makes witnesses reluctant to participate in the lineup procedure. These
witnesses supposedly feel that the attorney will relate their names to the suspect
or his friends and that this may lead to retaliatory measures against the witness.52
This argument is somewhat specious, for when the case proceeds to trial the witness
will become known to the accused anyway and the same fears of retaliation would
make the witness reticent to testify.
The most legitimate criticism of requiring attorneys at lineups is that lineup
observation is a time consuming task which requires few if any legal skills.' 3 Pro-
posed alternatives include photographic evidence of the lineup that could be ex-
amined later or shown to a jury, and the presence at lineups of a neutral magis-
trate.54 Until such alternatives, which would be acceptable under Wade,55 are put
into practice, attorneys at the lineup seem a good method to insure fairness.
The majority in Kirby must have found the arguments of the critics of lawyers
at lineups more persuasive than the arguments of the proponents, but more than
just the above considerations may have influenced the Court's decision. The ex-
dusionary rule of Wade and Gilbert not only prohibited introducing into evidence
an identification made at a post-indictment lineup where the suspect did not have
the benefit of counsel, but also did not permit any subsequent courtroom identifi-
cation that could not be shown to have been made independently of the lineup
identification. This was a very unpopular ruling. Congress passed and the Presi-
dent signed into law a measure the Senate Judiciary Committee stated was designed
to "overrule" Wade.50 Section 3502 of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 196857 provides as follows:
The testimony of a witness that he saw the accused commit or partici-
pate in the commission of the crime for which the accused is being tried
shall be admissible in evidence in a criminal prosecution in any trial court
ordained and established under article III of the Constitution of the
United States.
This statute is of questionable constitutionality since Congress cannot pass a statute
51 Contra, Read, supra note 49, at 366.
621d. at 373-74.
5 3 Note, Right to Counsel at Pre-Trial Lineups, 63 Nw. U.L REv. 251, 260 (1968).
5 Read, supra note 49, at 388-93.
55 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 239 (1967).
M S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 224 (1968). See also Read supra note 49, at
358-62.
57 18 U.S.C. 3502 (1970).
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overruling a Supreme Court interpretation of the Constitution,5" but it nonetheless
vividly illustrates the vehement official reaction to the Wade decision.
When the Supreme Court decided Kirby, it was faced with the IWade holding
requiring the right to counsel at post-indictment lineups and substantial precedent
for extending it to the pre-indictment situation. The Wade solutions to lineup mis-
identification of both requiring the accused to have counsel at the lineup and of using
the exclusionary rule were being attacked as being of dubious merit in correcting
the problem. Perhaps more importantly the judicial philosophy of the Court was
also changing. Justice Stewart's minority view in early cases such as Esobedo that
the right to counsel does not attach until after "formal prosecutorial proceedings"5 9
became the majority view after President Nixon's appointees joined the Court.
Chief Justice Burger, for example, disapproved of the Wade principle when he
was a circuit judge. In a concurring opinion in the pre-lJ7 ade case of Williams v,
United States,60 Circuit Judge Burger characterized the defendant's claim that his
right to counsel had been violated by the absence of an attorney at a police lineup
as a "Disneyland" contention and he bemoaned the fact that such arguments were
becoming commonplace.61 He went on to say that he believed such ideas were being
advanced because court-appointed lawyers were being maligned by indigent clients
who felt that all available defenses were not raised in their behalf. Judge Burger
urged that a lawyer should "be entirely free to withdraw rather than be compelled
to advance absurd and nonsensical contentions on pain of a vicious attack from the
jailhouse."6 2
The changing judicial philosophy of the Court, the negative Congressional re-
action to Wade, and the view that attorneys could not prevent misidentifications at
lineups, all go toward explaining the holding in Kirby. They do not go to explaining
the dubious manner in which the holding was reached. Any attempt to elucidate
this area must be speculative. Perhaps the most logical scenario is one in terms of
the Court's historic aversion to overrule itself. If the Kirby decision was to be made
in terms of the policy considerations, it would be almost impossible to distinguish
from WIade and Gilbert and would therefore require an overruling of those cases.
On the other hand, a decision made on constitutional grounds, as the actual decision
was, allows the Court to reach the same practical result without having to disturb
the Wade and Gilbert decisions. Since most lineups occur prior to indictment any-
how, lawyers are effectively eliminated from participation at police lineups by a
means much more institutionally satisfying than overruling a case.
The immediate implications of the Kirby decision are not as drastic as may first
appear. While it is true that the chances of misidentifications are increased some.
what, Wade had already been eroded by lower court rulings. When a IWade vio-
lation occurred, identifications were often admitted into evidence on grounds of
independent courtroom identifications 3 or convictions were later affirmed on
grounds that admission of such evidence was harmless error.04 In essence, with the
G8 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1
(1958).
59 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 494 (1964) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
60 345 F.2d 733 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
61 Id. at 736 (Burger, J., concurring).
62 id. at 737.
63 Government of the Virgin Islands v. Callwood, 440 F.2d 1206 (3rd Cir. 1971); United
States v. Ayers, 426 F.2d 524 (2nd Cir. 1970); United States v. Broadhead, 413 F,2d 1351
(7th Cir. 1969).
64 Wilson v. Gaffney, 454 F.2d 142 (10th Cir. 1972).
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Kirby decision the standard for admission of lineup identifications has reverted to
questioning whether any due process violations occurred rather than asking whether
the accused was allowed counsel.0 5
The actual importance of Kirby is not so much its effective overruling of 11'ade
as its indication of the present Supreme Court's narrow view of the right to counsel
at early stages of police investigation and the extent to which the Justices may con-
strict the law in order to fit their own version of how law enforcement agendes
should be allowed to proceed in trying to establish cases.60
Ira Bennell Sully
65 Of course, all actions of the police in gathering testimony are subject to fifth amendment
and fourteenth amendment due process limitations. In particular, this was held true for lineups.
In Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), the Court held that although Wade and Gilbert were
not retroactive in their effect, any lineup that occurred before the Wade and Gilbert decision
could still be challenged on due process grounds.
6 6 See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), where it was held that although state.
ments obtained in violation of Miranda safeguards were not admissable in a prosecution's case
in chief, they could be used on cross-examination to impeach a defendant's testimony if he chose
to testify in his own behalf.

